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REASON AND REASONABLENESS: THE 
NECESSARY DIVERSITY OF THE COMMON LAW  
Frédéric G. Sourgens* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article addresses the central concept of “reasonableness” in the common 
law and constitutional jurisprudence.  On the basis of three examples, the common 
law of torts, the common law of contracts, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
the Article notes that different areas of the law follow fundamentally inconsistent 
utilitarian, pragmatic, and formalist reasonableness paradigms.  The significance of 
this diversity of reasonableness paradigms remains largely under-theorized.  This 
Article submits that the diversity of reasonableness paradigms is a necessary 
feature of the common law.  It theorizes that the utilitarian, pragmatic and formalist 
paradigms are structural elements driving the common law norm-generation 
process.  This theory permits a new, more precise definition of hard cases as cases 
in which these paradigms lead to different results in a specific legal dispute.  It 
further provides a legal criterion to determine whether hard cases have been 
correctly resolved as a legal matter rather than as a matter of policy.  On the basis 
of this new understanding of hard cases, it is possible to explain a question left 
unresolved by Frederick Schauer’s article The Limited Domain of the Law namely 
how the common law develops as a limited domain while remaining responsive to 
changes in community standards and policy preferences.  By means of this theory, 
this article analyzes an important, and potentially dispositive, conceptual confusion 
underlying the recent Supreme Court affirmative action decision Fisher v. 
University of Texas and its treatment of good faith, and explains how that confusion 
can be overcome by future courts applying the decision.  
 
[U]nd die findigenTieremerkenesschon,  
dasswirnichtsehrverlässlichzuHaussind 
in der gedeuteten Welt. 
Rainer Maria Rilke1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Reasonableness is the keystone of the common law.  The edifice of the 
common law would collapse but for the balance struck between diverse and 
competing ends and interests by “reasonableness.”  For instance, reasonableness 
governs liability in negligence cases,2 determines what performance a contract 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, Washburn Law School. 
 1. Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Erste Elegie, in DUINESER ELEGIEN 7 (InselVerlag, 1923) (translated: 
“and the animals shrewdly noticed already, [¶] that we fail to be safely at home, [¶] in the interpreted 
world.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323 
(2012). 
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requires,3 sets the scope of permissible police intrusion in people’s private affairs,4 
defines the limit of criminal liability,5 and administers the diversity of the student 
body at state universities.6  It informs corporate law,7 banking law,8 commercial 
law,9 bankruptcy law,10 and civil procedure.11 
In all of these settings, “reasonableness” recognizes that there is not one 
absolute rule of conduct premised upon moral or religious command.  Instead, law 
depends upon the reciprocal regard for the interests of others—even and 
particularly those others holding different moral, religious, and political points of 
view.12  What this reciprocal regard legally requires of us is determined by a 
balancing test governed by the reasonableness standard. 
This “reasonableness” standard is deceptively intuitive: every person believes 
to know what is or is not “reasonable.”13  On its face, when people disagree with 
                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 689 passim 
(2013) (discussing reasonableness standards as part of good faith in contract law); Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1359-1363 
(2011) (contrasting fault in contracts to fault in negligence by reference to reasonableness standards). 
 4. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 1077, 1093 (2011). 
 5. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611 passim 
(2011). 
 6. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Fisher, Academic Freedom, and Distrust, 59 LOY. L. REV. 489, 505 
(2013) (noting the role of reasonableness in university decisions to choose allocation of resources). 
 7. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1171 (2013) (“The inquiry in corporation law focuses on the demonstrable 
effort and the quality of decisionmaking as the measure of reasonableness, and thus an error in judgment 
is not a wrong. The answer to the question—what would a reasonable director do?—does not lie in a 
review of the substance of the business decisions, but instead on the substance of good faith and effort 
made by the custodians toward the care of the corporation.”); Leo Strine, Jr. et al, Loyalty’s Core 
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 671 (2010) (“The 
Delaware Supreme Court then made plain that the enhanced burden it was imposing on directors to 
show that they had a good faith, reasonable basis to believe that the corporation faced a threat was 
designed ‘to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated by a 
good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders.’”) (citations omitted). 
 8. See, e.g., Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance 
Jurisprudence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1461, 1524 (2011) (“As a final step, the court might test the 
reasonableness of any outcome by comparing the end result to what would occur in the absence of 
judicial intervention. Essentially, this final step assures that the court's intervention does not 
substantially deviate from the course that is most likely to be taken in the absence of judicial 
involvement. It merely removes the rent-seeking, contractual arbitrage and other inefficiencies that 
derive from the disparity between present-day economic realities and strict contractual rights.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Unfortunate Life and Merciful Death 
of the Avoidance Powers Under Section 103 of the Durbin-Delahunt Bill: What Were They Thinking?, 
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829, 1841 (2004). 
 10. See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel, Midnight in the Garden of Good Faith: Using Clawback Actions to 
Harvest the Equitable Roots of Bankrupt Ponzi Schemes, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19 passim (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rule Making, 107 
NW. L. REV. 447, 467 n.135 (2013) (discussing the role of good faith in discovery). 
 12. Cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK 
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 79-84 (2d ed. 2001) (making a similar point about Greek political theory in 
the context of a discussion of Sophocles’ Antigone). 
 13. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 
BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2003) (“The reasonable person test converts the esoteric and intractable 
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable risks into a comprehensible, intuitive inquiry.”). 
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one another whether specific conduct was reasonable, as they may do in jury 
deliberations, they discuss specific facts of a case and not their abstract moral 
commitments.  This impression is deceptive because reasonableness continues to 
draw on the very moral and political commitments, which it would seek to 
circumvent.  In difficult cases, these commitments can in fact be outcome 
determinative.14 
What then, is the content of the reasonableness standard upon which the 
common law relies?  Doctrine exhaustively discusses this question within each area 
of the common law.15  What so far has escaped scholarly attention is that different 
areas of law rely upon inconsistent utilitarian, pragmatic, and formalist paradigms 
of reasonableness.16  Thus, as discussed in part I.A, the law of negligence relies 
upon a utilitarian reasonableness paradigm, the so-called “Hand formula.”17  
According to the “Hand formula,” a person is liable for negligence if the cost of 
adequate precautions is smaller than the multiple of the probability of injury times 
its gravity.18  As discussed in part I.B, this conception of reasonableness classically 
has been rejected by the law of contracts.19  The law of contracts instead relies 
upon a pragmatic reasonableness paradigm.20  According to this paradigm, 
reasonableness depends upon whether other like-situated people would deem that 
there is a rational basis for the actions of the contracting parties, given their 
                                                                                                     
 14. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statemanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (2008) 
(“Of course, what qualifies as ‘reasonable’ disagreement, as opposed to ‘unreasonable’ or ‘the most 
extreme,’ can be . . . based in contestable social values.”). 
 15. For recent contributions to this scholarship, see supra notes 2-11. 
 16. One might say that reasonableness in this sense is a “cryptotype” of American common law. 
Rodolfo Sacco defines such as “cryptotypes” as follows:  
Man continually follows rules of which he is not aware or which he would not be able to 
formulate well. Few would be able to formulate the linguistic rule we follow when we 
say "three dark suits" and not "three suits dark" whereas in special context we might 
speak of "the meadows green." . . . Linguists are now defining this phenomenon. We are 
subject to specific rules without perceiving them.  Our visible, superficial language is the 
result of identifiable transformations of latent linguistic patterns that are more permanent 
than the visible ones. 
Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law II, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 
384-85 (1991). 
 17. See, e.g., Miller & Perry Torts, supra note 2, at 330-31 (“[T]he Restatement may be said to 
adopt an almost unconstrained, reductionist, utilitarian-economic test for negligence”). 
 18. Id. at 328. 
 19. See, e.g., In re Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Texas courts have 
repeatedly stated that the test of good faith is not negligence or diligence and that it is immaterial that 
the buyer was aware of facts that would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry.”); R. Wilson 
Freyermuth, Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the Rhetoric of Good Faith, 1998 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1035, 1056 (1998) (“As Professor Summers has noted in his work on good faith performance and 
enforcement of sales contracts, the subjective standard should rule out claims that a party acted in bad 
faith due to her negligence . . . .”).  For further discussion of a recent rapprochement between negligence 
and the law of contracts following the revisions to the U.C.C., see infra Part III.B.  
 20. On the influence of pragmatism on the development of U.S. common law, see Robert S. 
Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought – A Synthesis and 
Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981). 
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contractual undertaking.21  As discussed in part I.C, reasonableness in the context 
of the Fourth Amendment rejects this paradigm and instead applies a formalist 
reasonableness paradigm.22  What is reasonable is determined by applying the 
original constitutionally mandated equilibrium between the values of privacy and 
security to current technological circumstances.23 
The consequence of this clash of paradigms is significantly under-theorized.24  
As discussed in Part III.A, the existence of competing utilitarian, pragmatic, or 
formalist reasonableness paradigms is significant because it gives rise to hard cases 
that arise whenever these paradigms require inconsistent results in a given dispute.  
But as discussed in Part III.B, the existence of multiple reasonableness paradigms 
also permits the law to develop by switching from one reasonableness paradigm to 
another, and thus address a perceived normative failure in a specific area of law, 
without losing the internal coherence of the law as whole.25 As discussed in Part 
III.C, on the basis of the recent Supreme Court decision, Fisher v. University of 
Texas on affirmative action, legal error can occur when courts fail to understand 
that there are multiple conceptions of reasonableness within the common law.26 As 
further discussed in Part III.C, this error can be avoided once the paradigm of 
reasonableness adopted by the Court is appropriately understood. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, this Article will conclude that the diversity of 
reasonableness paradigms is a necessary, structural quality of the common law.  As 
discussed in Part IV.A, the presence of pragmatic, utilitarian, and formalist 
reasonableness paradigms cannot be resolved by reference to some higher order 
principle because each paradigm is axiomatic in its own right.27  Thus, the diversity 
cannot be resolved through further doctrinal refinement because each paradigm 
                                                                                                     
 21. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW73-74 (1988) 
(tracking the relationship between rule establishment and relevant community norms in the common law 
in the context of the example of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.). 
 22. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476 (2011). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Some current scholarship discusses the limitations of any of the currently available theories to 
understand the phenomenon of law.  See Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of Law, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1909 (2004). It proposes that “[t]o understand what the members of this group hold in common 
with each other but not with the members of most other social institutions is to try to understand not the 
meaning of the word ‘law,’ and perhaps not even the concept of law, but the practice (in the 
Wittgensteinian sense) of law as we know it and the institutions of the law as we know them.”  See id at 
1955-56.  This article submits that the diversity of reasonableness paradigms within the common law 
provides the grammar (in the Wittgensteinian sense) to understand the practice in question.  
 25. This phenomenon has frequently been noted but mischaracterized as principally rhetorical to 
make palatable a policy shift.  See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 74; but see, e.g., Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis: Evidence from Cardozo and Posner Torts 
Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2010) (“Cardozo’s distinctiveness is a grand rhetorical style 
exemplifying traditional method. During a twenty-four-year career, he displayed pragmatic sensibilities 
blending intuitions of substantive justice with thick doctrine incorporating economic, moral, and social 
factors. In Isaiah Berlin’s terms, Cardozo was a fox who knew many things. Cardozo frequently shifted 
among doctrines, rendering complex opinions that demonstrate the capacity, power, and limits of 
traditional legal analysis”). The rhetoric in question reflects a structural necessity rather than persuasive 
flourish.  
 26. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).  
 27. See John Finnis, Response, 57 VILL. L. REV. 925, 930 (2012). 
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represents a different legal first principle embedded within the common law.28  As 
discussed in Part IV.B, this heterogeneity of first principles within the common law 
confirms its structure as an inductive normative system rather than a deductive 
one.29  Rules are generated from judicial problem solutions for specific cases; 
general rules are not judicially applied to each specific problem.30 
Although scholarship has long noticed the inductive structure of the common 
law, it incorrectly assumed that the common law followed the inductive logic of 
scientific inquiry, which typically uses a single paradigm at a time.31  As Part IV.B 
explains, this assumption fails to account for two essential qualities of the inductive 
process in the common law.  First, unlike scientific inquiry, which theorizes from 
the observation of an outside world through inductive reasoning, the common law 
uses inductive reasoning to theorize about itself.  Second, unlike scientific inquiry, 
the common law uses inductive reasoning normatively, not descriptively.  Inductive 
reasoning explains why people ought to act in a certain way rather than why the 
world already, of necessity, observes certain basic natural laws of its own accord.  
The establishment of a “formal” paradigm of the law consequently must lag behind 
the actual resolution of cases within the common law.  The common law itself 
cannot apply the paradigm as a matter of formal constraint without ceasing to be an 
inductive system and becoming a deductive one instead.  Consequently, if the 
common law is an inductive system, it must at the same time rely upon multiple 
paradigms to function.  As an inductive system it would include formal paradigms 
representing the currently theorized explanation of the law.  And an inductive 
system would also include pragmatic and utilitarian paradigms providing the basis 
for further development of future formal paradigms. 
Understanding that the common law at the same time relies upon inconsistent 
pragmatic, formalist, and utilitarian reasonableness paradigms explains why the 
common law appears at the same time to be both an independent “limited domain” 
and an open system responding to social and political policy preferences.  It thus 
helps to resolve the ongoing debate among legal theorists whether law is a closed 
domain by demonstrating that this debate focuses on an inapposite question.  The 
question is not whether the common law is an open or closed domain, but how it 
can be both at the same time.  This Article takes a first step towards providing that 
answer.  
II.  DIVERGING THEORIES OF REASONABLENESS 
Different areas of law apply markedly different reasonableness paradigms.  
                                                                                                     
 28. See id. 
 29. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican Legitimacy, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 425 (2012); Dennis J. Sweeney, The Common Law Process: A New Look at 
an Ancient Value Delivery System, 79 WASH. L. REV. 251, 264-9 (2004). See also BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS22-23 (1921) (the common law’s “method is 
inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW1 (1881) [hereinafter Holmes Common Law] (“[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it 
has been experience”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-1 
(1897) [hereinafter Holmes Path]. 
 30. See, e.g., EISENBURG, supra note 21; Cunningham, supra note 25. 
 31. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS81, 96-105, 108 (2012). 
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Depending upon the area of law, the common law relies upon utilitarian, pragmatic, 
and formalist reasonableness paradigms.  This Part provides an example for the use 
of each of these reasonableness paradigms: negligence (applying utilitarianism),32 
the common law of contracts (applying pragmatism),33 and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence (applying formalism).34 
All three paradigms have in common that reasonableness takes account of the 
diversity of ethical, moral, religious, and political commitments held by the 
members of the society that it governs.35  Reasonableness is not a vehicle to 
disguise the imposition of a comprehensive value system on society at large.36  
Instead, each paradigm seeks to address this plurality of substantive moral 
allegiances of the members of civic society by engaging in a balancing exercise 
premised upon a different “basic unit” of judgment.   
Importantly, as this Article will discuss, each of these attempts is ultimately 
inconsistent with the others because it relies upon a different “basic unit” of 
judgment.  Utilitarianism looks to wealth maximization, pragmatism to community 
standards, and formalism to values inherent in our constitutional tradition.  This in 
itself suggests that there is no universal common denominator of reasonableness, 
no basic unit of judgment that could govern the entirety of human interaction.37  
Reasonableness can only be understood across the law if one looks for something 
other than a common substantive definition and looks for its structural significance, 
instead.38 
It is also not the case that an area of law is “naturally” linked to a certain kind 
of reasonableness paradigm. In fact, areas of law themselves switch the 
reasonableness paradigm upon which they rely: famously, the principle of “buyer 
beware” dominated the law of contracts in the 19th century, premised upon a 
formalist, laissez-faire reasonableness paradigm.39  Later, “[o]ver the course of the 
twentieth century, the failure to disclose material facts during contract formation 
increasingly placed parties at risk of violating the growing duty of good faith and 
fair dealing in contracts” because of the adoption of a different, pragmatic 
reasonableness paradigm.40  This Part’s analysis of reasonableness paradigms 
within specific areas of law is not monolithic, but itself subject to change and 
                                                                                                     
 32. See infra Part II.A. 
 33. See infra Part II.B. 
 34. See infra Part II.C. 
 35. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 22, 1787 (explaining the 
importance of maintaining these differences within a republican society); For a utilitarian take on this 
diversity, see, for example, HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 296 (7th ed. 1907) [hereinafter 
Sidgwick]; for a pragmatic one, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 
1539, 1554 (1988); for a formalist one, see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 
1063-4 (1975)  
 36. See Holmes, Common Law, supra note 30 at 1. 
 37. See infra Part IV.A. 
 38. See infra Part IV.B. 
 39. Florrie Young Roberts, Disclosure Duties in Real Estate Sales and Attempts to Reallocate Risk, 
34 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001). Compare Robert B. Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) (“The American economy has paid lip service for two hundred years to the twin 
laissez-faire principles of vigorous competition and consumer self-reliance, the latter embodied in the 
maxim caveat emptor.”). 
 40. Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 880 (2005). 
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challenge.41 
Nevertheless, identifying the reasonableness paradigm at work in a particular 
area of law is valuable.  It lifts the common confusion that reasonableness is 
amorphous or malleable and thus unpredictable.42 Reasonableness appears 
amorphous or malleable because it is thought of incorrectly as a single principle 
that is applied inconsistently,43 rather than as a multiplicity of concrete but 
inconsistent and competing paradigms.  As discussed in this Part, once focus is 
shifted to understanding the theoretical paradigm informing the use of 
reasonableness, one arrives at a precise and accurate tool to understand 
jurisprudence and resolve nagging doctrinal problems.  
A.  Utilitarian Reasonableness: The Abacus of Negligence 
Guido Calabresi called tort law “the paradigmatic law of the mixed society.”44  
It deserves this unique label because of the central place of reasonableness: liability 
is imposed only upon a weighing of all the “various circumstances involved . . . 
without engaging in minutiae of control” of future behavior.45  It does not engage 
in the outright prohibitions of risky behavior, on the one hand, and mandated 
purchase of collective insurance, on the other hand; nor does it require every person 
to buy insurance for the consequence of permitted behavior and otherwise 
mandates that loss should lay where it falls.46  Instead, it assigns liability on the 
basis of a balance between risk, its social cost, and individual responsibility.47 
This Article looks in particular to the classic “Hand formula” and the tort of 
negligence.48  Described as “an objective reasonableness calculus of social costs 
and benefits,”49 the “Hand formula” states that “if probability be called P; the 
injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L 
                                                                                                     
 41. See infra Part II. 
 42. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (“The phrase ‘good 
faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the context.”); Kerr 
Equilibrium, supra note 22, at 491 (“Skeptics claim that the only guide to what makes an expectation of 
privacy ‘reasonable’ is that five Justices say so . . . .”). 
 43. See supra Part III.C. 
 44. Guido Calabresi, Torts – The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519, 521 (1978). 
 45. Id. at 529. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Cf. Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 661 (2001) 
(“The reasonableness test in antitrust law, like the negligence test in tort law, rests on a balancing of the 
social costs and benefits of the defendant's actions,”). 
 48. This Article does not claim that the entirety of tort law relies upon a utilitarian reasonableness 
paradigm.  It is quite likely that there are different paradigms of reasonableness at work even within the 
law of torts.  See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1972) (focusing in particular on the tort rules governing liability for ultra-hazardous activity and 
observing that there are a two paradigms of tort law, one of reciprocity defining tort liability by 
reference to rights to be free from risk and the paradigm of reasonableness defining tort liability on the 
basis of a utilitarian calculus).  For a current discussion of the paradigm clash in tort theory, see John L. 
Watts, Fairness and Utility in Products Liability: Balancing Individual Rights and Social Welfare, 38 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 597 (2011). 
 49. David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure 
Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 250 (1996); see also Eric E. Johnson, Negligence X Factor, 2012 
CARDOZO L. REV. 318 (2012).  
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multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [less than] PL.”50  This formula is express in 
requiring balancing—and as such is exemplary of the “paradigmatic” nature of tort 
law.51  It also provides the most straight-forward metric of determining the balance: 
efficiency.52 As discussed in this Part, this approach adopts a utilitarian perspective 
that is both gratifyingly mechanistic and soothingly amoral.53  It hands the judge 
the abacus needed to determine liability for a specific instance without needing to 
make ultimate judgments on the apparent moral worth of an activity.54 
1.  Utilitarian Reasonableness 
The central motto of utilitarian reasonableness is that size matters: 
utilitarianism prescribes that one must take the action that leads to the greatest net 
total utility or value.55  Thus, “ulilitarianism [sic] tells us to help those who will 
most benefit—those who will gain the most.”56  Classic utilitarianism considered 
that pleasure was the unit of utility.57  It further considered that pleasure and pain 
could be measured on the same scale, i.e., that it is possible to subtract pain done to 
a person from the pleasure gained by another by simple arithmetic.58  
Consequently, the conduct that yielded the most net pleasure after all pleasure has 
been added up and all pain has been subtracted is the reasonable conduct in which 
to engage.59 
The core benefit of classic utilitarian analysis is that it is essentially value 
neutral or amoral.60  It does not ascribe any inherent value to certain conduct, as 
such.61  Virtuous conduct is not good simply because it is virtuous; it is good 
                                                                                                     
 50. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 51. See Calabresi supra note 44. 
 52. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on 
Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1154 (2000) (summarizing Judge Posner’s long-standing 
argument “that cost-benefit analysis in the Kaldor-Hicks sense,” equating efficiency with wealth 
maximization, “is both a useful method of evaluating the common law and the implicit method (implicit, 
for example, in the Learned Hand formula for determining negligence) by which common-law cases are 
in fact decided—and rightly so in my opinion,”). 
 53. This of course has also been a major basis for its criticism.  See, e.g., Robin Paul Malloy, The 
Political Economy of Co-Financing America’s Urban Renaissance, 40 VAND. L. REV. 67, 120 n. 199 
(1987) (“Posner's analysis has become too confined by amoral principles of wealth maximization and 
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 54. See Guido Calabresi, Toward a Unified Theory of Torts, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 1-2 (2007). 
 55. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2 
(Hafner Publ’g Co. 1948) (1838); see also SIDGWICK, supra note 35, at 23-38 (discussing the concept of 
reasonableness and its relationship to utilitarianism). 
 56. Mark S. Stein, Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique, 50 B.C. L. REV. 489, 490 (2009). 
 57. See David O. Brink, Mill’s Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2010). 
 58. BENTHAM,, supra note 55, at 1; JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 11 (1879) (“The creed 
which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that 
actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the 
reverse of happiness.  By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness pain, 
and the privation of pleasure,”). 
 59. MILL, supra note 58, at 11. 
 60. See C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal 
Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1041 (1980). 
 61. See, e.g., BENTHAM supra note 55, at 12. 
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because it makes the larger community happier than the alternative.62  Because 
happiness could be measured on a single scale, there is a common denominator 
across value systems that would permit a person to make and defend a social choice 
quite apart from their own moral beliefs by reference to the resulting increase in 
general utility at large if it were chosen.63 In this sense, utilitarianism is a moral 
system that inherently lends itself to balancing tests premised upon 
reasonableness.64 
The amoral nature of classic utilitarianism also gives rise to one of its 
frequently cited problems: accounting for the value of torture or economic or 
majoritarian unfairness.65  Assume that society as a whole feels more pleasure (in 
the form of a greater sense of security) in torturing terror suspects than those few 
(innocent) suspects feel the pain of torture. Utilitarianism, the problem goes, would 
consider such torture reasonable.66  Alternatively, assume one social group would 
create greater value by subjugating and exploiting a different social group.  A 
classic example for such conduct is Sparta: the relatively few Spartiates, or 
members of the Spartan soldier class, subjugated an entire population of helots, or 
indentured farm laborers, in order to create one of the most powerful, wealthy, 
stable, and “perfect” city-states in antiquity.67  Utilitarianism, problematically, 
would consider such exploitation reasonable.68 
This problem could be mitigated, but not entirely avoided, if utilitarian 
reasonableness is understood not as a casuistic prescription of action, but as a 
generalizable principle or rule.69  Rather than attempting to determine a rule of 
                                                                                                     
 62. See, e.g., MILL supra note 58, at 25 (“[A]nd if we are told that its end is not happiness, but 
virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not 
believe that it would earn others immunity from similar sacrifices?”). 
 63. See Leonard G. Ratner, The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution, 12 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 723,736-37 (1984) (critiquing non-utilitarians as “disclos[ing] no nonmystical source 
of . . . rights, which are, in fact, derived from the [utilitarian] search for increased per capita need/want 
fulfillment,”). 
 64. It is in part for this reason that the utilitarian paradigm of tort law classically has been dubbed 
the “reasonableness paradigm.”  See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 537, 542 (1972). 
 65. See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 
62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1120-21 (2013). 
 66. See Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The Doubtful Case for Public Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
127,169 (2013); see also Robert Bejesky, The Utilitarian Rational Choice of Interrogation from a 
Historical Perspective, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 327, 335-36 (2012). 
 67. For the historical rise of Sparta, and its dependence upon the helots, see DONALD KAGAN, THE 
OUTBREAK OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 9-30 (1969). For the social standing of helots compared to 
other Greek farmers at the time, see VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, THE OTHER GREEKS: THE FAMILY FARM 
AND THE AGRARIAN ROOTS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 104 (1999). For the influence of Sparta on 
Greek political philosophy, see e.g. SIR ERNEST BARKER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND 
ARISTOTLE 14 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1959).  For a discussion of a potential reconciliation of helots with 
progressive utilitarian thought, see e.g. NADIA URBINATI, MILL ON DEMOCRACY: FROM THE ATHENIAN 
POLIS TO REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 47-48 (2002).  
 68. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 179-83 (1973). 
 69. This distinction tracks the evolution from act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.  See Brink, 
supra note 57, at 1671, 1674-80 (“Act Utilitarianism: An act is right insofar as its consequences for the 
general happiness are at least as good as any alternative available to the agent.  Rule Utilitarianism: An 
act is right insofar as it conforms to a rule whose acceptance value for the general happiness is at least as 
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decision that fits specific individuals with their specific ability to feel pleasure and 
pain, utilitarian ethics seeks generalizable rules.70  It assumes an average human 
being.71  By focusing on the average human being, it is possible to minimize 
exceptional individual sadism and predict in more general terms what conduct is 
reasonable and efficient. 
This turn to generalizable utilitarian rules was brought to its final conclusion 
by equating the unit of utility not as pleasure but as financial value, or money.72  By 
substituting money for pleasure, it is possible to focus on the average “market 
price” for types of pleasure.73  It takes out of the equation the person who overpays 
for a specific good or service out of irrational personal preference for that good or 
service.  Instead, it creates a truly universal measure of what pleasures and pains 
are empirically worth. 
Utilitarianism, unsurprisingly, shares much with economic analysis.74  
Economic analysis looks for the most financially efficient outcome.75 Similarly, 
economic analysis is not based upon the economics of the exceptional person, but 
instead insures society against the consequences of being composed of average 
market participants.76 
                                                                                                     
great as any alternative rule available to the agent.”). For the continuing problems of this recasting of 
utilitarianism, see RAWLS supra note 68, at 179-83. 
 70. SIDGWICK, supra note 35, at 18 (“We cannot determine the right conduct for a private individual 
in a particular case, without first ascertaining the rule which it would be generally expedient to maintain 
in the society of which he is a member.”); see also Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 993 (2008). 
 71. See, e.g., Leonard G. Ratner, The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution, 
12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 723,736-37 (1984) (“Per capita, or average, fulfillment is a theoretical concept that 
does not allocate specific fulfillment shares. But it is not a fallacious or meaningless concept that 
sacrifices individual fulfillment to a fictitious collective happiness.  Rather it is a useful hypothesis that 
identifies the fulfillment goal of the community,”). 
 72. See Posner, supra note 52, at 1154. 
 73. See Calibresi, supra note 54, at 2. 
 74. Oman & Solomon, supra note 65, at 1119 (describing law and economics as utilitarianism’s 
“main variant”); cf. Catherine Kemp, The Uses of Abstraction: Remarks on Interdisciplinary Efforts in 
Law and Philosophy, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 877n.42 (1997) (“The normative aspect of traditional Law 
and Economics theory is a form of rule-utilitarianism familiar to legal scholars, wherein definite norms 
for adjudication are founded on a principle of ‘wealth-maximization’ similar to the ‘pleasure 
maximization’ of traditional utilitarian theories.”).  Law and Economics scholars have later sought to 
distance themselves from classic utilitarianism and viewing themselves as improving the utilitarian 
paradigm.  For a discussion of this conception of law and economics scholarship, as well as its 
problems, see David Campbell, Welfare Economics for Capitalists: The Economic Consequences of 
Judge Posner, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2233 (2012). 
 75. Oman & Solomon, supra note 65, at 1119. 
 76. See id. at 1118 (“On this view, tort law should be seen in terms of safety regulation and social 
insurance.  A primary purpose of making tortfeasors liable is to police their conduct by imposing fines 
on certain undesirable activities.  The modern law-and-economics movement has pursued this basic 
approach with the greatest tenacity and rigor. Money damages, on this view, force actors to fully 
internalize the cost of their own decisions, pushing them toward optimal levels of investment in 
precautions and the like. Even those who have not adopted the law-and-economics framework continue 
to see tort law in terms of shifting losses from plaintiffs to defendants in order to achieve distributionally 
desirable outcomes by, for example, transforming corporate actors into insurers for those that they 
harm,”) (citations omitted). 
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2.  Negligence and the Utilitarian Calculus 
The link between the academic analysis of the law of negligence and utilitarian 
reasonableness is firmly established.77  The “Hand formula” in particular bears all 
the traits of utilitarian analysis.78  It is premised not upon the inherent value of any 
conduct but rather upon an economic balancing test.79  The aim of this balancing 
test is social welfare maximization.80  Negligence liability is premised upon failure 
to take efficient precautions, and thus the common law of negligence seeks both to 
encourage efficient precaution in the future and to enforce efficient compensation 
for accidents.81 
The “Hand formula” follows rule-utilitarian rather than act-utilitarian logic.82  
It does not require an examination of which of the parties would be, on the whole, 
happier upon winning the law suit.83  Rather, the “Hand formula” seeks to establish 
a rule, which if followed would maximize social welfare within the polity adopting 
over time.84 
The choice of utilitarianism for evaluating negligence claims makes 
affirmative sense.  Parties asserting negligence claims must establish a tenable 
rationale for attribution of liability across substantive moral views.85  Thus, a 
negligence claim with regard to an abortion procedure must make sense to both 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Miller & Perry Torts, supra note 2, at 331 (“the Restatement may be said to adopt an almost 
unconstrained, reductionist, utilitarian-economic test for negligence.”) (footnote omitted); Ronen Perry, 
Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV. 987, 991-92 (2008) (“It may thus be said that the Restatement adopts an 
almost unconstrained, reductionist, utilitarian/economic test for negligence.”) (footnote omitted); Watts, 
supra note 48, at 635-37 (noting the utilitarian basis of the law governing design defects). 
 78. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1693, 1718 (1995) (“the familiar Learned Hand formula . . . is often interpreted as a utilitarian 
metric of socially reasonable and unreasonable conduct.”) (footnote omitted); Richard W. Wright, 
Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 177-8 (2002) (“the generally 
accepted view (among academics) [is] that negligence in tort law is defined by the Hand formula, which, 
given its embedded impartiality and aggregation principles, is a transparently utilitarian formula.”).  But 
see, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
311, 360 (1996) (arguing that “the notion that the economic interpretation of the Hand Formula fits 
American law better than the social contract conception is seriously overstated, at best,”). 
 79. See Posner, supra note 52, at 1154 (“I have long argued that cost-benefit analysis in the Kaldor-
Hicks sense is both a useful method of evaluating the common law and the implicit method (implicit, for 
example, in the Learned Hand formula for determining negligence) by which common-law cases are in 
fact decided—and rightly so in my opinion.”). 
 80. See Miller & Perry, supra note 2, at 328-30 (discussing reasonableness as welfare 
maximization); Watts, supra note 48, at 609 (“From a utilitarian and efficiency perspective, it is not 
reasonable to spend $30,000 in order to prevent $20,000 in losses.”). 
 81. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort 
Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 150 (2011) (footnote omitted); see also Miller & Perry, supra note 2, at 
332.  See generally Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
 82. See, e.g., Posner Negligence, supra note 81, at 33 (“When the cost of accidents is less than the 
cost of prevention, a rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident 
victims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability,”). 
 83. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Calabresi, supra note 44, at 521 (“torts has always been present and significant, that it is so 
today in the so-called “people's democracies,” are testimonies to the fact that purely “liberal” and purely 
collective systems exist solely in the minds of theoreticians and ideologues. The world knows better,”). 
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pro-choice and pro-life advocates.86  A utilitarian cost-benefit analysis seeks to take 
value judgments inherent in other appraisals of the desirability of conduct—and the 
associated liability rules—out of the equation and instead create a form of intuitive 
arithmetic of liability that is well-suited to the intricate everyday problems that tort 
law encounters.    
B.  Pragmatic Reasonableness: The Common Law of Contracts 
Good faith in the common law of contracts expressly leaves behind the 
utilitarian paradigm of reasonableness and the “Hand formula.”87  Reasonableness 
in the context of the common law of contracts does not prescribe a utilitarian 
diligence in the performance of a contract, but rather requires a different type of 
conduct altogether.88  The reference to “reasonableness” by the tort of negligence 
and the common law of contracts thus creates only an apparent common 
denominator.  Rather than evidencing a common denominator between torts and 
contract, the different applications of the reasonableness standards reveal that there 
is a diversity of paradigms currently within the common law.89 
This Article focuses on the implied duty of good faith to establish the 
paradigm of reasonableness followed by the common law of contracts.90  The 
implied duty of good faith focuses in particular on the obligation to employ 
reasonable efforts in the performance of the contract and the corresponding duty 
not to act in a manner that undermines the basis of the parties’ bargain.91  This 
Article confirms that this conception of good faith is rooted in modern 
pragmatism.92  According to this paradigm, reasonableness is not measured by 
reference to utility but by excluding clearly unreasonable behavior.93  That is to say 
that pragmatic reasonableness requires a party to provide a rational basis for its 
                                                                                                     
 86. See generally Lucy E. Hill, Seeking Liberty’s Refuge: Analyzing Legislative Purpose under 
Casey’s Undue Burden Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 365 passim (2012) (discussing recent legislative 
attempts to disturb the value neutrality of tort law in the abortion setting).  
 87. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 369, 376, n.35 (1980). 
 88. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 89. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).  Although other sections of the 
Restatement also introduce rules premised upon a good faith obligation—for instance, the rules of 
interpretation of contract or promissory estoppel—section 205 is the central, most direct application of 
good faith and reasonableness in the common law of contracts.  See, e.g., Leon Trakman, Pluralism in 
Contract Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1031, 1082 (2010) (“An interpretative theory of contracting holds that 
the formation of contracts is determined primarily through a process of interpretation, or more 
expansively, through contract construction”).  It is also the clearest example of the difference between 
utilitarian reasonableness and pragmatic reasonableness.  Id. at 1068-75. 
 91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981). 
 92. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Cowboy Contracts: The Arizona Supreme Court’s Grand Tradition of 
Transactional Fairness, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 191, 201 (2008) (“Reliance on the Restatement . . . aligns the 
court with the progressive moderation, realism and pragmatism of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts . . . ,”). 
 93. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818-21 (1982). 
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actions given the contract.94  This rational basis ultimately is measured not by an 
absolute standard, but by reference to relevant community standards.95 
As discussed in this Part, the pragmatic reasonableness of the implied duty of 
good faith enables courts to adopt a perspective that is responsive to commercial 
needs and adaptive to changes in the environment of the transactions concerned.  It 
hands the judge a tool to dispense commercially relevant decisions that protect the 
typical risk allocations between business partners in similar transactions. The 
implied duty of good faith thus creates a space in which parties can form long-term 
expectations in their bargains based upon their business judgment rather than their 
intimate knowledge of the law.   
1.  Reasonableness in Pragmatism 
Pragmatism originated as an American school of philosophy in the late-19th 
and early-20th centuries.96 It had an important influence on the development of U.S. 
jurisprudence.97 The chief unifying theme of pragmatism was a deeply held 
empiricism98 that informed the critical study of social structures, including the 
common law.99  Pragmatism has four classical elements.  First, “inquiries should be 
instrumental in that the inquiry should be most concerned with its effects, i.e. what 
will be the consequence of this decision?”100  Second, pragmatic inquiry denies the 
means/end dichotomy in the sense that “the logic of pragmatic inquiry was the 
means and the end, all at the same time.”101  Third, it similarly denies the validity 
of a facts/value dualism because “facts” themselves are linguistic representations of 
social (truth) values.102  Finally, it is anti-foundational in the sense that hypotheses 
                                                                                                     
 94. Corporate law scholarship recently conceptualized of the pragmatic paradigm of reasonableness 
as requiring a showing of a rational basis.  See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the 
Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 
398, 402 (2007); see generally Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 521 (2013).  
 95. See, e.g., Cibran v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 375 F.Supp.2d 1355, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (using 
pricing decisions by local gas stations to establish standards for good faith actions). 
 96. Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary Legal 
Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565, 579 (2007); see also Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra 
note 20, at 865-66. 
 97. See Summers, supra note 20, at 865-66. 
 98. See id.; Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional 
Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 141, 178 (2014) (“Philosophical pragmatism allows us to focus on what new 
governance and legal empiricism offer for a new legal realism while noting the limits they must confront 
in asking how law is applied and changes. Philosophical pragmatism recognizes that all our choices are 
conditional; they depend upon the existing conditions in society. Empirically grounded, philosophical 
pragmatism calls for a new legal realism that explores variation to build conditional legal theory. 
Problem-centered, such a new legal realism must grapple with comparative analysis of the tradeoffs of 
institutional choices in light of the empirical evidence, experimentalist trial and error, and the dynamics 
and potential perversities of participation and collective action. Critically reflexive, such a new legal 
realism pursues an emergent analytics. Fallibilistic, it encourages experiment stimulated by uncertainty. 
We elaborate on these ideas below,”). See generally John C. P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and 
Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640 passim (2012). 
 99. See supra notes 96-98. 
 100. Desautels-Stein, supra note 96, at 580. 
 101. Id.at 581. 
 102. Id. at 581-82. 
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and decisions for pragmatists “are constantly and continually open to question and 
revision: good decisions will be decisions that are the most useful” in their given 
context.103 
The currently leading version of pragmatism is the sociology of 
communicative action developed by Jürgen Habermas.104 Reasonableness for 
Habermas consists of two related elements: first, “[a]n assertion can be called 
rational only if the speaker satisfies the conditions necessary to achieve the 
illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about something in the world with 
at least one other participant in communication.”105  Second, a “goal directed action 
can be rational only if the actor satisfies the conditions necessary for realizing his 
intention to intervene successfully in the world.”106 
Critically, someone must be able, “when criticized, [to] provide grounds for it 
by pointing to appropriate evidence” supporting his statement.107  Moreover, in the 
context of rule establishment, he or she when criticized must be able “to justify his 
action by explicating the given situation in light of legitimate expectations.”108 
Communicative action “has a deliberative or transformative dimension.”109  Its 
transformative dimension is to create truly common goals through 
                                                                                                     
 103. Id. at 582-83. 
 104. See generally 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter Habermas Theory]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND 
GELTUNG (1998) [hereinafter Habermas Law]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KOMMUNIKATIVES HANDELN UND 
DETRANSZENDENTALISIERTE VERNUNFT (2001) [hereinafter Habermas Reason].  For a succinct 
summary of Jürgen Habermas’ pragmatics and legal theory, see David M. Rasmussen, Jurisprudence 
and Validity, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1059 (1996).  This version of pragmatism has influenced Cass 
Sunstein, Bruce Ackerman, Adeno Addis, and Robert Post among others.  Jonathan Weinberg, The 
Right to be Taken Seriously, 67 MIAMI L. REV. 149, 171-72 (2012) (“[Habermas’s conception of 
communicative action] is front-and-center in the work of Cass Sunstein and Bruce Ackerman. It is the 
basis for Robert Post's description of democracy as resting on citizens' being able to participate in those 
modes of communication.”) (footnotes omitted);  see generally Cass Sunstein, Group Judgments: 
Statistical Means, Deliberation and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2005) (proposing 
improvements to Habermas’ deliberative process by using information markets in the deliberative 
process); Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 109 
(2000) (“[I]nstitutions should be designed to ensure that when shifts are occurring, it is not because of 
arbitrary or illegitimate constraints on the available range of arguments.  This is a central task of 
constitutional design. In this light, a system of checks and balances might be explained, not as an 
undemocratic check on the will of the people, but as an effort to protect against potentially harmful 
consequences of group discussion.”); Sunstein Revival, supra note 35, at 1544; Bruce Ackerman & Ian 
Ayres, The Secret Refund Booth, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1107, 1127-28 (2006); Bruce Ackerman, 
Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 Yale L.J. 2279, 2347 (1999) (“One citation from Jürgen Habermas or 
Kenneth Arrow is worth a million cites from Anthony Kennedy's law clerk.”); Adeno Addis, Role 
Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1377 (1996); Robert Post, Participatory 
Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 487-89 (2011) (noting the importance of 
communicative action theory in the context of the First Amendment); Robert Post, Recuperating First 
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1995). 
 105. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 11; see also Rasmussen, supra note 104, at 1065-67. 
 106. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 11; see also Habermas Reason, supra note 104, at72-84 
(anchoring pragmatism in a Wittgensteinian conception of grammar). 
 107. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 15; Habermas Reason, supra note 104, at 32-45; see also 
Rasmussen, supra note 104, at 1065-67. 
 108. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 15; Habermas Reason, supra note 104, at 32-45. 
 109. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1545. 
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communication.110  Communicative action is transformative precisely because it 
creates a common space in which all participants have a stake despite the fact that 
their initial acts and statements served the utterer’s or actor’s selfish point of 
view.111  This common, public space creates normative structures that ultimately 
reflect the current policy needs of the relevant community.112 
Reasonableness within the communicative action paradigm thus requires two 
different—yet equally important—things: in the context of a purely illocutionary 
act, reasonableness speaks to the fact that a speech act is tenable.  It is tenable if it 
can be understood by a member of the relevant language community as addressing 
a common problem.113  Thus, for example, “the bus is blue” is not a tenable 
response to a question whether to expand “marriage” to include same-sex unions; 
the statements, that marriage is a basic social and religious institution intended 
exclusively to foster procreation and that marriage is a socially privileged 
recognition of a relationship between two consenting adults that cannot be 
rightfully denied to any human being on the basis of sexual orientation without 
denying them equal protection, are.114 In this sense, determining the relevant 
audience for the speech act will in many instances determine its reasonableness.  In 
the context of public deliberation, reasonableness requires a public space within 
which an exchange can occur from a point of relative equality.115  A statement in 
this public space is “reasonable” if it is (1) made within this public space and (2) 
can be understood by others in the community as actually addressing the joint 
problem for debate no matter its substantive content. 
Reasonableness is not limited to speech, but also extends to action.116  In this 
sense, an action is reasonable if it can be effective.117 Effectiveness in 
communicative action is not measured by reference to the purely selfish intentions 
of the actor, but by reference to their common space.118  Thus, an action is effective 
if it achieves a problem solution and does not undermine the public space that led 
                                                                                                     
 110. See generally id. at 1548-55; cf. Habermas Reason, supra note 104, at 32-45. 
 111. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1550. 
 112. See Habermas Law, supra note 104, at 168-70; cf. Arthur Lupia, Yanna Krupnikov & Adam 
Seth Levine, Beyond Facts and Norms: How Psychological Transparency Threatens and Restores 
Deliberation’s Legitimating Potential, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 459, 465 (2013) (discussing the development 
of Habermas’s theory on point in detail). 
 113. See Rasmussen, supra note 104, at 1065-66. 
 114. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-96 (2013) (opinion of Kennedy, 
J.); id. at 2706-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 115. See Lupia et al., supra note 112, at463-67 (2013) (“This is the circumstance that Habermas 
examines. He seeks a method for generating legitimacy in the absence of a preexisting universally 
accepted moral code and in the presence of positive attitudes toward the possibility of progress through 
change. Habermas's thesis is that this challenge of modernity can be managed through the adoption of a 
procedural intervention. He argues that ‘democratic procedure should ground the legitimacy of law.’ 
The procedural intervention is a form of deliberation. Habermas, quoting Frank Michelman, describes 
the intervention or deliberation as ‘refer[ring] to a certain attitude toward social cooperation, namely, 
that of openness to persuasion by reasons referring to the claims of others as well as one's own’”); see 
generally sources cited supra note 104. 
 116. Habermas Theory, supra note 104, at 50. 
 117. Id. at 54. 
 118. Id. at 48. 
2014] REASON AND REASONABLENESS 89 
to its adoption.119 
Reasonableness in communicative action is anchored in the social context of 
each specific statement or action to assess whether viewed in that context it has a 
rational basis.120  It is a procedural paradigm rather than a substantive 
reasonableness paradigm.  True to its pragmatic roots, it focuses on the structure of 
inquiry and its effectiveness in the real world rather than supplying it with an 
independent, value-based content.121  It is precisely in rejecting such a value-based 
metric that it distinguishes itself from a utilitarian consequentialist philosophy, 
which views utility maximization as the end value which any pragmatic structure 
must ultimately serve.122 
2.  Common Law of Contracts and Pragmatic Reasonableness 
Good faith in the common law of contracts is comparatively under-
theorized.123  While it is used as a single principle, the Restatement states that the 
law of contracts in fact relies upon a plurality of conceptions of good faith.124  The 
Restatement directly relied upon an article by Robert Summers, which submitted 
that good faith in the law of contracts lacked an independent meaning of its own 
and instead served as an “excluder” of a “wide range of heterogeneous forms of 
bad faith.”125  Steven Burton proposed, alternatively, that the duty of good faith 
instead should be viewed as a means to recapture foregone opportunities.126  
Critically, Miller and Perry have argued that under either definition, courts 
applying the duty of good faith descend into pure descriptivism:  good faith no 
longer is a normative standard of how people ought to perform their contracts but 
merely a description of how people do.127  Using the pragmatic paradigm of 
reasonableness, it is possible to resolve the confusion in prior doctrinal approaches 
                                                                                                     
 119. Id. at 52. 
 120. See generally sources cited supra notes 104-105,111. 
 121. See, e.g., Desautels-Stein, supra note 96, at 580-83. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See, e.g., Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 694 (“Despite the general acceptance and apparent 
importance of good-faith performance in the United States, courts and scholars have not been able to 
agree on the exact meaning of this concept. For many years, no attempt was made to provide clear 
definitions of good faith, at least in the common law of contracts, and the doctrine was applied 
somewhat intuitively. But even when courts and scholars have begun to formulate general guidelines, no 
consensus has crystallized.”). 
 124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 cmts. a, d (1981). 
 125. Summers, supra note 93, at 818-21; see also Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General 
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) 
[hereinafter Summers General Contract Law]; see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 
205 cmt. d (1981). 
 126. See Burton, supra note 87.  Doctrine consistently treats Professor Summers’ and Professor 
Burton’s conceptualizations of good faith as the principal doctrinal works on good faith.  See, e.g., 
Miller & Perry,, supra note 3, at 693-95; Emily Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A 
(Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1,4 (2005) (stating that the article “explores in some depth 
the theoretical differences between the Summers/excluder-analysis and Burton/foregone-opportunities 
approaches to good faith”); Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Fess, Proposed Standard for Evaluating 
When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the 
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585 (1996). 
 127. See Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 690-95. 
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and address Miller and Perry’s criticism that the current conception of good faith in 
the law of contracts is deeply flawed.128 
The duty of good faith, limits the discretion of the contracting parties in 
performing their contractual bargain.129 The doctrine proposes two 
conceptualizations of the good faith limitation of discretion, Professor Summers’ 
“excluder analysis” and Professor Burton’s limitation on recapture of foregone 
opportunities.130  Both approaches ultimately can be reconciled by means of the 
pragmatic reasonableness paradigm that the performing party must provide a 
rational basis for its actions in the specific context of the bargain struck by the 
parties.131 
The Restatement expressly follows the “excluder principle” in limiting abuse 
of discretion of the contracting parties, rather than providing a positive duty to use 
discretion in a certain manner.132  Drawing on Professor Summers’ theory, it lists 
the following examples of impermissible, unreasonable action: “evasion of the 
spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of 
imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or 
failure to cooperate in the other party's performance.”133  This list is not exclusive, 
but must be extended by factual analogy to current jurisprudence in future cases.134  
Consistently with the excluder conceptualization of good faith, the Restatement 
“did go on to try to articulate the general purposes of the section: that of securing 
‘faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified 
expectations of the other party,’ and compliance with ‘community standards of 
decency, fairness or reasonableness.’”135 
This account of good faith ultimately queries the rational basis for actions of 
the party whose performance is alleged to be in bad faith.  The action has a rational 
basis if it avoids the patent examples of bad faith of the “excluder analysis.”136  
That conduct is in bad faith because it can no longer be reconciled with community 
standards.137  There is bad faith because any justification for one’s actions can no 
longer be understood by other similarly situated persons as a valid solution to a 
common problem and thus fails as an illocutionary act.138  As Professor Summers 
subscribed to the pragmatic paradigm in contemporaneous writings, this 
consistency of his account of good faith with pragmatic reasonableness is hardly 
                                                                                                     
 128. See id. at 727, 740. 
 129. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); see also Houh, supra 
note 126, at 16 (noting that the case “is widely read as one of the earliest American cases to imply a 
duty” of good faith). 
 130. See sources cited supra note 126. 
 131. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981); Miller & Perry, supra note 3, 
at 698-702 (discussing the influence of Professor Summers’ excluder analysis); see also Houh, supra 
note 126, at 30. 
 133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981). 
 134. See id.; Summers General Contract Law, supra note 125, at 207. 
 135. Summers Good Faith, supra note 96, at 821 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 
205 cmt. a (1981)). 
 136. See, e.g., Miller & Perry, supra note 3 at 698-702; Summers General Contract Law, supra note 
125, at 206-07. 
 137. See, e.g., Miller & Perry, supra note 3 at 703-05.. 
 138. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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surprising.139 
Professor Burton challenged and sought to refine the excluder 
conceptualization of good faith.140  At its heart, Professor Burton’s argument is that 
a discretion exercising party violates the duty of good faith when it “refuses to bear 
the expected cost of performance.”141  The parties’ justification for its performance 
becomes subjectively pre-textual because it knows that it has acted inconsistently 
with the economic assumption of the bargain.142  Although Professor Burton places 
an emphasis on subjective intentions to determine what the expected cost of 
performance was, he admits that as a matter of proof in an actual case, cost of 
performance is measured by “reasonable businesspersons . . . in the commercial 
setting.”143  Professor Burton thus overlays a reasonable reliance lens to provide the 
general definition of good faith in the law of contracts Professor Summers denied 
existed. 
The justification for the foregone opportunity analysis similarly looks to the 
rational basis for the performing party’s actions.  Its principal focus, however, is 
not on the illocutionary question whether the justification offered for conduct 
makes sense, but on effectiveness.144  Conduct lacks a rational basis because it 
renders the common instrument of the parties’ intention ineffective.145  It destroyed 
                                                                                                     
 139. See, e.g., Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 20, at 863. 
 140. See Burton, supra note 87, at 369-70 (“A majority of American jurisdictions, the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) now recognize the duty to perform 
a contract in good faith as a general principle of contract law. The conduct of virtually any party to any 
contract accordingly may be vulnerable to claims of breach stemming from this obligation. Yet neither 
courts nor commentators have articulated an operational standard that distinguishes good faith 
performance from bad faith performance. The good faith performance doctrine consequently appears as 
a license for the exercise of judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable and 
inconsistent applications.  Repeated common law adjudication, however, has enriched the concept of 
good faith performance so that an operational standard now can be articulated and evaluated.”) (citations 
omitted); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, passim (1981) [hereinafter Burton Article 2]; Houh, supra note 
126, at 30; Miller & Perry Contracts, supra note 3, at 706-12. 
 141. Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 706. 
 142. See Burton, supra note 87, at 371. 
The identity of forgone opportunities is determined by an objective standard, focusing on the 
expectations of reasonable persons in the position of the dependent parties. Whether a particular 
discretion-exercising party acted to recapture forgone opportunities is a question of subjective intent. 
The two approaches are consistent. If a discretion-exercising party uses its control to recapture a forgone 
opportunity, it follows that it is not acting for a purpose within the contemplation of the parties. If such a 
party acts for a reason contemplated by the parties, it is not recapturing a forgone opportunity. Supra 
text accompanying note 87, at 390-91. 
 143. Burton Article 2, supra note 140, at 24; Compare Burton, supra note 87, at 390-91; see Miller & 
Perry, supra note 3, at 710-11. 
 144. See supra Part II.B.1.  Burton’s theory still can be explained by reference to illocutionary 
reasonableness, as well.  The parties express their respective economic expectations in certain contract 
terms.  An expectation is reasonable if other similarly situated persons would have the same 
expectations upon reviewing these terms due to relevant community standards.  It is thus similarly when 
there is no means of reconciling the justification of a performance with the community understanding of 
those terms that the economic expectations of the parties are violated and action is in bad faith.  Bad 
faith is thus again reducible to the failure of the justification of performance as an illocutionary act.  
There is no rational basis for the performance in question.  
 145. See Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 706. 
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the equivalent of their public space, namely their shared private space of the 
bargain by impermissibly undermining their initial economic expectations.146  
When addressing the question of whether a party acted in good faith in this broader 
sense, one must determine whether the action is one that is effective in bringing 
about the joint bargain of the parties.147  This again brings to bear community 
standards but through a different lens: the question is not whether the actions of the 
parties under the specific terms of the contract can be understood by other like 
situated actors, but whether other like situated actors would consider that the 
performance made effective the initial exchange of promises contained in the 
contract.148  This is the alternative formulation of a rational basis test inherent in the 
pragmatic reasonableness paradigm.149 
As recent literature bears out, it ultimately does not matter which approach, 
Summers’, Burton’s, or both, a court applies.150 The result under both is ultimately 
the same because “all major accounts of good faith share a common denominator”: 
community standards.151 
In their recent article on good faith in the performance of contracts, Miller and 
Perry sought to indict this paradigm of good faith as “deeply flawed.”152  Their 
article proved that  
[A]n action by a contracting party must be determined to be in good faith as long 
as it is considered so by a single expert (in the case of common practice) or by a 
single member of the community (in the case of a common view of morality). This 
must be the case even if all other experts disagree.153 
They submit that this result “is not particularly desirable: it is an extremely 
permissive perception of good faith that would permit any behavior considered 
acceptable by a minority, no matter how small.”154  Essentially, Miller and Perry 
challenge that this result is undesirable because it does not coincide with any 
normative theory of law.155 
The research done by Miller and Perry independently confirms that in practice, 
good faith in the law of contracts uses pragmatic reasonableness.  It required that 
“[a]n assertion can be called rational only if the speaker satisfies the conditions 
necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about 
something in the world with at least one other participant in communication.”156  
This prescription overlaps completely with Miller and Perry’s conclusion.157  To be 
justified in their normative criticism, Miller and Perry thus have a mighty obstacle 
                                                                                                     
 146. See Burton, supra note 87, at 385. 
 147. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 148. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 3, at 385, 390-91. 
 149. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 150. See, e.g., Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 724; Houh, supra note 126, at 33-35. 
 151. Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 724.See, e.g., Houh, supra note 126, at 33-35. 
 152. Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 727. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 740. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Habermas Theory, vol. I, supra note 104, at 11; see also Rasmussen, supra note 104, at 1065-
67. 
 157. Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 740. 
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to overcome—the tradition of pragmatic instrumentalism deeply embedded in 
American law.158  This tradition is instrumental to the functioning of the common 
law in creating a space for legal development in accordance with policy needs of 
society as a whole without swinging wildly at the formation of a simple or 
supermajority.159 Rather, consistent with the deliberative roots of pragmatic 
inquiry, it moves upon the formation of a social consensus and only holds parties to 
bargains predating its formation to such newly developed norms once it has fully 
formed.160 
C.  Reasonableness as Equilibrium Adjustment: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Constitutional criminal procedure departs from the classic common law 
reasonableness paradigms discussed in the previous Parts.161  What constitutes a 
“reasonable” search or seizure, and whether evidence from an unreasonable search 
should be excluded from evidence at a later criminal trial despite the “good faith” 
of the police officer, refer to yet another rule of conduct.162  What reasonableness 
means in this context consequently must be determined by yet a third paradigm 
other than the utilitarian calculus of tort law and the pragmatic rational basis 
inquiry of contract law.163 
This Article again will focus on a specific issue in constitutional criminal 
procedure, namely Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.164  The Fourth Amendment 
guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”165 Because the Fourth 
Amendment is silent on how it must be applied, the consequence of the right to be 
secure in one’s person, houses, papers and effects therefore had to be judicially 
created.166 
                                                                                                     
 158. See generally Summers, supra note 20 (explaining the deep roots of pragmatic instrumentalism 
in U.S. law).  
 159. See supra Part IV.B. 
 160. See id. ; cf. Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 74.  One area in which such a consensus crystallizes is 
unconscionability in form agreements.  One recent article notes, “as courts have reinvigorated 
unconscionability as a policing tool for standardized agreements, they have introduced into the doctrine 
a ‘sliding scale’ approach that, if properly cultivated, can empower courts, and increasingly, arbitrators, 
to do what consumers, legislators, and legal scholars have yet been unable to do—control oppression 
and overreaching in consumer form contracts.”  Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in 
Formalism – The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconsionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 5 (2012). 
 161. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 698 (2011) constitutional criminal procedure were 
“transformed from a putative descendent of the common law to an unabashedly policy-driven doctrine” 
from the Burger Court onwards); Kerr, supra note 22, at 492 (a principled approach to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in the form of “equilibrium adjustment differs from general common law in 
evolution of constitutional law in a significant way”). 
 162. See sources cited supra note 161. 
 163. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Laurin, supra note 161, at 690. 
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In his recent article, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, Professor Orin Kerr proposes that a rights-based theory does permit 
one to uncover an underlying coherence and consistency in the apparently jumbled 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.167  His theory roots reasonableness in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in a contemporary, sophisticated formalism: American 
constructivism.168  Tracing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence historically, 
Professor Kerr explains that new technology brings about a facial conflict between 
different constitutional values of privacy and security.169  The reasonableness of 
police conduct is determined by bringing these values to a reflective equilibrium 
established by comparing the current circumstances to the ideal balance between 
these values in a hypothetical Year Zero.170  This hypothetical Year Zero assumes 
that neither police nor criminals have any technological tools at their disposal to 
commit or investigate crime.171 
As discussed in this Part, this approach adopts a perspective that protects 
fundamental social and political values.  It hands the judge a tool to correct even 
prevalent conduct by reference to legal first principles.  It thus creates a strong and 
dependable normative system that provides a bulwark against unwanted social 
change.   
1.  Reasonableness in Constructivist Formalism 
Attacking formalism is a favorite stalking horse for legal scholars.172  Although 
                                                                                                     
 167. Kerr, supra note 22, passim. 
 168. See cf. Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1146 (1999) 
[hereinafter Leiter] (“A sophisticated formalist like Ronald Dworkin, who has a rich theory of legal 
reasoning, still remains within the formalist camp because he sees the law as rationally determinate and 
he denies that judges have strong discretion (i.e., he denies that their decisions are not bound by 
authoritative legal standards),”). 
 169. Kerr, supra note 22, at 485. 
 170. Although associated with an originalist point of view, Professor Kerr has rightfully defended his 
position as essentially constructivist.  See generally Christopher Slobogin, An Original Take on 
Originalism, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 14, 14 (2011) (“At bottom, equilibrium-adjustment theory is 
originalism, and thus suffers from all of the problems associated with that methodology.”); Orin S. Kerr, 
Defending Equilibrium-Adjustment, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 84, 85 (2011) (“Equilibrium-adjustment is 
not originalism. It is a theory of maintaining the status quo balance of power, not an effort to restore 
eighteenth-century rules. That understanding explains why living constitutionalists and pragmatists alike 
have embraced equilibrium-adjustment, and why the chief attack on it has been launched on originalist 
grounds.”). 
 171. Kerr, supra note 22, at 485. 
 172. See, e.g., Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and Dysfunctional Role of Formalism in Federalism: 
Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 930 (2012) (“Formalism is a 
jurisprudential stepchild of the legal academy, and the term is frequently used as a pejorative.”); 
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 509-10 (1988) (“With accelerating frequency, legal 
decisions and theories are condemned as ‘formalist’ or ‘formalistic.’ But what is formalism, and what is 
so bad about it?  Even a cursory look at the literature reveals scant agreement on what it is for decisions 
in law, or perspectives on law, to be formalistic, except that whatever formalism is, it is not good.”).  
For a recent example, see, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing 
Crisis, 93 B.U. L. REV. 389, passim (2013) (warning of the consequences of a literalist approach to 
mortgage assignments). 
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the term has had a revival of sorts, it is still not consistently defined.173  For 
purposes of this Article, the term formalism refers to any legal theory that meets 
three criteria common to the term’s typical usage.  First, formalism submits that 
every legal question is capable of a legal solution.174  Second, it posits that there is 
only one right outcome to any legal dispute.175  Third, it argues that this solution 
will be revealed by following the internal logic from first principles to their 
mandated conclusions.176 
Constructivism is one of the most “sophisticated” types of contemporary 
formalism.177  It submits that every dispute is equally susceptible to a legal 
solution.178 Constructivism argues that there is only one legal solution to any 
case,179and arrives at this conclusion by treating the law as a seamless web 
premised upon strong first principles.180 
Constructivism is a soft and sophisticated sort of formalism because it is 
                                                                                                     
 173. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (1999) (defining formalist as “rule-based decision making” but proposing 
that “[t]he new formalism is instead best viewed as a pragmatic approach to judicial foreign relations 
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 175. See, e.g., Schauer Formalism, supra note 172, at 511-12 (“We condemn Lochner as formalistic 
not because it involves a choice, but because it attempts to describe this choice as compulsion.”); 
Summers Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 20, at 867. 
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non-formalist (so long as the principle requires the otherwise applicable rule to be displaced for a 
different, specific rule).  This conception of formalism is on the whole more consistent with the 
“scientific” nature of the law attacked by Kennedy and, much earlier, Holmes, Cardozo, and Llewellyn.  
Kennedy, supra at 1747-49.  
 177. Leiter, supra note 168, at 1146-47 (“A sophisticated formalist like Ronald Dworkin, who has a 
rich theory of legal reasoning, still remains within the formalist camp because he sees the law as 
rationally determinate and he denies that judges have strong discretion (i.e., he denies that their 
decisions are not bound by authoritative legal standards). Some have thought that Dworkin denies the 
‘autonomy‘ of legal reasoning, but this accusation is patently question-begging: Dworkin's claim is 
precisely that the moral considerations that ultimately fix a party's legal rights are themselves part of the 
law.  Dworkin simply has a richer picture of the class of legal reasons than other formalists--indeed, too 
rich for some formalists. Justice Scalia, for example, thinks that for judging to be genuinely mechanical 
(per the formalist's ideal), the interpretive principles that are part of the class of legal reasons must be 
austerely simple, lest discretion sneak into adjudication under the guise of ‘interpretation.’”). 
 178. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 333-54 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin Empire]; see RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 114-23 (1977) [hereinafter Dworkin Rights]; Ronald Dworkin, 
In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 359 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin Theory]. 
 179. See Dworkin Empire, supra note 178, at 345-54; Dworkin Rights, supra note 178, at 114-23. 
 180. See Dworkin Empire, supra note178, at 347-49 (explaining that the law operates as a seamless 
web); Dworkin Theory, supra note 178, at 359 (same). 
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premised upon the coherent application of a legal principle—fundamental rights—
rather than the mechanical application of “the most locally applicable” legal rule.181  
Constructivism further posits the fundamental right that “[e]ach person possesses 
an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole 
cannot override.”182 
This principle of justice is codified in a social contract agreed upon from an 
analytic original position of equality.183  The terms of the just social contract are 
agreed upon from a position of ignorance of one’s future or potential position in 
society by means of rational choice.184  In agreeing upon terms, rational choice 
requires adoption of the most efficient terms.185  In a situation where there are 
several equally efficient proposals, the proposal most benefiting the least favored 
group in society wins.186 
The rational choice of justice is tested against a reflective equilibrium,187 
which is needed “to see if the principles which would be chosen would match our 
considered convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable way.”188  It 
operates by “working from both ends” our moral intuitions and rational choice 
from the vantage point of positional ignorance, meaning that if any rule results in a 
conflict between our moral intuitions and the original position, one or the other 
must be modified.189  By altering contractual conditions, withdrawing judgments, 
and conforming to principle, the rational choice of justice theory proposes that 
“eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses 
reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments 
duly pruned and adjusted.”190 
The reflective equilibrium balances the totality of relevant countervailing 
commitments to create a seamless normative web191 that reflects “existing political 
rights.”192  These “[p]olitical rights are creatures of both history and morality: what 
                                                                                                     
 181. Dworkin Rights, supra note 178; (setting out constructivist method in jurisprudence); accord 
Rawls Justice, supra note 68, at 7, 63 (explaining constructivist method in U.S. liberal political theory); 
see also Schauer Formalism, supra note 172, at 509-10 (discussing same). 
 182. Rawls Justice, supra note 68, at 3.  Dworkin’s deep theory of rights is “[b]ased on Rawls’ social 
contract theory.”  Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of 
Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 431-32 (2013). If anything, Ronald 
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Rawls did.  RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 262-65 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2011). 
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advantage.  The basic structure is a public system of rules defining a scheme of activities that leads men 
to act together so as to produce a greater sum of benefits and assigns to each certain recognized claims 
to a share in the proceeds.”). 
 184. See generally id.at 95-100, 136-150 (explaining choice from the Rawlsian original position). 
 185. See id.at 67 (“[A] distribution of goods or scheme of production is inefficient when there are 
ways of doing still better for some individuals without doing any worse for others.”). 
 186. See generally id.at 75-83 (discussing efficiency and choice between equally efficient proposals). 
 187. Id. at 20 (“It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is 
reflective since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their 
derivation.”). 
 188. Id. at 19. 
 189. Id. at 20. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See generally Dworkin Empire, supra note 178, at 333-54 (discussing legal decisionmaking). 
 192. Dworkin Hard Cases, supra note 35, at 1063. 
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an individual is entitled to have, in civil society, depends upon both the practice 
and the justice of its political institutions.”  This means that while “judges must 
make fresh judgments about the rights of the parties who come before them . . . 
these political rights reflect, rather than oppose, political decisions of the past.”193  
Thus, the choice within the reflective equilibrium is to find the decision that best 
takes account of each political right and is consistent with all of them.194 
Constructivism submits that its rights-based balancing test must be supported 
by an “overlapping consensus” of “comprehensive” moral and political 
philosophies and ideologies.  Furthermore, this overlapping consensus requires that 
the reflective equilibrium that results must be consistent with all reasonable moral, 
religious, or political points of view—be it for different reasons internal to each 
moral, religious, or political point of view given that these comprehensive moral, 
religious, and political points of view must coexist in a pluralist society.195  In 
short, the balancing test of the reflective equilibrium does not claim to subscribe to 
a particular ideological point of view but to be broadly consistent with any 
ideological position.196 
The concept of reasonableness in constructivism is one of civic, reciprocal, and 
full cooperation.  It requires more than the rational basis required by pragmatic 
reasonableness.  Rather than providing an acceptable rational basis for one’s 
actions, constructivist reasonableness requires individuals to propose and accept 
“fair terms of cooperation.”197  A term is only “fair” if it perfectly reflects the 
cooperative values of the fundamental rights at the center of the formalist legal 
system.198  Put differently, while there may be a rational basis to disagree with 
these values, or the rules premised upon them, such disagreement is relegated to the 
realm of political choice rather than legal judgment.199 
2.  The Constructivism of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Professor Kerr’s recent Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment demonstrates that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence adopts a 
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constructivist reasonableness paradigm.200  As Professor Kerr discusses, the 
constructivist paradigm organizes current jurisprudence to reveal that “[w]hile 
existing doctrine is complex and fact-specific, it is not at all a ‘mess’”201 as 
previously presumed. 
a.  Constructivist Reasonableness as Fourth Amendment Paradigm 
In keeping with constructivist methodology, Professor Kerr’s theory begins in 
a hypothetical world of “Year Zero,” which “represents an imaginary time, a sort of 
beginning of the universe for criminal investigations.”202  This analytical original 
position displays the countervailing commitments that must be balanced for police 
to investigate crime and for courts to limit police power and avoid abuses.203  The 
original balance permits police to “conduct surveillance in public, and speak with 
suspects, victims, or eyewitnesses” and to “walk the beat and observe whatever 
they see in public.”204  Based on this work they can gather probable cause to 
“detain a person” and “obtain warrants and make arrests.”205  Furthermore, 
warrants “must only allow the government to search particular places for particular 
evidence: no ‘general’ warrants are permitted.”206 
Thus, “the Fourth Amendment in Year Zero strikes a balance between security 
and privacy,” if perhaps not perfectly.207  What is important is that “Year Zero 
strikes a stable balance of power to enforce the law.”208  In constructivist terms, it 
creates political rights that can be reduced to principle and applied coherently and 
consistently over time: a principled translation of the balance to new facts and 
circumstances is possible and does not descend into arbitrary policy-preference.209 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence only appears in disarray because of the 
effect of constant technological advancement on the balance struck in the 
hypothetical Year Zero position.  Such developments “threaten the privacy/security 
balance because they enable both cops and robbers to accomplish tasks they 
couldn’t before, or else to do old tasks more easily or cheaply than before.”210  
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Once the effect of technological change is factored into judicial decision-making, it 
becomes apparent that courts are simply trying to maintain the Year Zero balance 
of privacy/security under new circumstances rather than make or change policy.211 
Kyllo v. United States212 is the paradigmatic case for Equilibrium 
Adjustment.213  The government in Kyllo suspected that Danny Kyllo was growing 
marijuana in his home, a process requiring significant heat from high-intensity 
lamps.214  From the passenger seat of a car parked across the street from the house, 
two United States agents pointed an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to 
scan the heat signature of the house and detected that “the roof over the garage and 
a side wall of [the] petitioner's home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the 
home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex.”215  On the 
basis of the thermal imaging, as well as tips from informants and utility bills, “a 
Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of [the] petitioner's 
home, and the agents found an indoor growing operation involving more than 100 
plants.”216  Mr. Kyllo entered a guilty plea after losing his efforts to suppress the 
evidence obtained at his home.217  After an initial successful appeal requiring the 
trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the intrusiveness of the thermal 
imaging technology used, the district court again did not suppress the evidence 
obtained from the initial search and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit confirmed the ruling because the petitioner “had shown no subjective 
expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat 
escaping from his home. Even if he had . . . there was no objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy because the thermal imager did not expose any intimate 
details of Kyllo's life, only amorphous hot spots on the roof and exterior.”218 
The United States Supreme Court in a majority decision authored by Justice 
Scalia disagreed with the Ninth Circuit.  Centrally, it reasoned that searching the 
interior of a home by whatever means is reasonable only if it complies with the 
“ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of 
privacy . . . .”219  It deduced from this principle that “obtaining by sense-enhancing 
technology any information regarding the home's interior that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is 
not in general public use.”220  It explained that to “withdraw protection of this 
minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment” because it would undercut the “degree of 
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privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.”221 
Professor Kerr uses Kyllo as the paradigmatic case for Equilibrium Adjustment 
because it expressly adopted a balancing approach to constitutional interpretation 
that applies a fundamental principle to novel facts.222  This application facially 
departed from the rule announced in prior jurisprudence and faithfully applied by 
the Ninth Circuit in Kyllo.223  In constructivist terms, the “original position” 
reflected in the Court’s prior reasonable-expectation-of-privacy jurisprudence had 
to be adjusted because it no longer was consistent with existing value judgments of 
the reflective equilibrium.224  In other words, because of technological change, 
prior jurisprudence no longer was consistent with the political right to privacy 
underlying the constitutional order to be interpreted and thus require a change in 
jurisprudence.225  Professor Kerr then traces the same constructivist method 
through recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as a constant thread holding these 
decisions together.226 
Equilibrium adjustment, like constructivism, is supported by an overlapping 
consensus of different comprehensive political and moral ideologies.227  Its 
adoption by Justice Scalia to defend privacy rights against the traditional reception 
of the Bill of Rights certainly support that claim: it is precisely the method used by 
living constitutionalists to defend the Court’s decision to defend privacy rights 
against the traditional reception of the Fourteenth Amendment in Roe v. Wade and 
its progeny.228  In other words, the adoption of constructivism by jurists 
traditionally associated with an originalist position perforce supports the existence 
of an overlapping consensus—within the narrowly tailored area within which 
originalists agree to its use. 
The consequence of Equilibrium Adjustment is that through a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” and other “reasonableness” tests, reasonableness can be 
expressed in terms of civic, reciprocal and full cooperation.  Like the Rawlsian 
observation that “it is by the reasonable that we enter as equals the public world of 
others and stand ready to propose, or to accept, as the case may be, fair terms of 
cooperation with them,”229 Professor Kerr proposes that equilibrium adjustment 
“facilitates the coherence of group decisionmaking.”230  Using constructivist 
theory, it is possible to define what “reasonable” means:  the case-by-case rule that 
can be expressed as substantively fair terms of cooperation between the 
government’s exercise of its police powers and the general population’s privacy 
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rights.  The “exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe 
that the reasons we offer for our political actions may reasonably be accepted by 
other citizens as justification for those actions”231 because they would agree that the 
balance between privacy and security is appropriately struck.  We would agree that 
it is appropriately struck when the resulting rule seems fair to a disinterested 
rational person considering its fairness both from the point of view of the 
(potentially erroneously) accused as well as the victim. 
Constructivist reasonableness further differs starkly from its utilitarian and 
pragmatic cousins.  As Professor Kerr explains, constructivist reasonableness aims 
“to restore the status quo ante, not serve as an instrument of change.”232  This is 
diametrically opposed to paradigms of reasonableness that seek to “ensure that the 
law reflects the ‘felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories, [and] intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious.’”233  Rather than 
seeking to be an instrument of change to adapt the law to new circumstances, 
constructivist reasonableness “is a kind of ‘command theory’—a theory of 
interpretation seeking guidance from prior historical moment—rather than a theory 
of legal evolution.  This is different from most concepts of common law reasoning 
in constitutional law.”234 
b.  Constructivist Reasonableness and the Good Faith Exception 
The constructivist reasonableness paradigm also underpins the meaning of 
“good faith” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.235  “Good faith” is relevant to 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when a court finds there to have been an illegal 
search and must determine whether the evidence gathered in the illegal search can 
nevertheless be admitted into evidence during a criminal trial.236  The Supreme 
Court introduced the good faith exception in 1986 in United States v. Leon237 to 
answer “whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so 
as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by 
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and 
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neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.”238 
The Court premised its conclusion on the observation that “[w]hether the 
exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, our decisions 
make clear, is ‘an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.’”239  
This separate question “must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of 
preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief of inherently trustworthy 
tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and 
neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.”240  When police officers 
act “in objective good faith” (i.e., objectively reasonably), the Court noted, “the 
magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants [by permitting 
application of the exclusionary rule] offends basic concepts of the criminal justice 
system.”241 
The development of the good faith exception since Leon is only consistent 
with the constructivist paradigm of reasonableness and inconsistent with 
utilitarianism or pragmatism.  In Illinois v. Krull,242 the Supreme Court extended 
the good faith exception to reasonable reliance by police officers upon a state 
statute permitting warrantless administrative searches.243  In Arizona v. Evans,244 
the Supreme Court extended the good faith exception to clerical errors by the court 
in the logging of an arrest warrant that had in fact been quashed unbeknownst to an 
arresting police officer relying upon the computer record.245  In Herring v. United 
States,246 the exception was extended again to innocent police clerical errors.247  
Finally, in Davis v. United States,248 the exception was extended to a situation 
where police had relied, “to the letter,” upon binding appellate precedent that was 
later overturned by the Supreme Court.249 
All of these cases are consistent with constructivist reasonableness.  The 
original privacy/security equilibrium has to be adjusted for the complex modern 
apparatus for the administration of criminal justice.  The clerical errors at issue in 
Arizona v. Evans and Herring v. United States have the most direct link to 
technological change: computer record keeping error.250  Illinois v. Krull concerned 
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the balance of administrative searches, a development that responded to 
commercial and technological change in its own right.251  Davis v. United States 
was brought about because of the need for appellate courts to interpret, and police 
to apply, Supreme Court jurisprudence on automobile searches – an independent 
change to the Year Zero balance.252  The good faith exception in all these cases 
captures a necessary condition for the administration of justice according to the 
original privacy/security balance to function in current practice.  Without it, 
technological change in the administration of justice (rather than investigation of 
crime) and inefficiencies in judicial reaction to technological change would of 
necessity skew the balance in favor of privacy and against security.  Law 
enforcement officers would have to become data management experts and Supreme 
Court justices swami because they could not rely upon the tools and departmental 
guidance with which they were provided to do their jobs.   
This classification of good faith explains how the Court can insist how the 
exception can both rest upon objective good faith and apply a culpability of 
conduct test to determine it.253  If an officer were to act dishonestly, the action 
would not be in good faith because the person in the hypothetical original position 
would not accept the purported justification of the officer for his actions.  The 
conduct would be “culpable.”254  However, a law enforcement officer could not 
objectively rely upon an executive order suspending the Fourth Amendment 
entirely even if the officer honestly believed he or she had to act within its 
confines.255  The conduct would be culpable in the sense the term is used in 
jurisprudence because it is “grossly negligent” or no longer reconcilable with a 
reasonable good faith belief by the law enforcement officer that his or her conduct 
is lawful.256  The analysis is objective because it looks to the reasonable police 
officer from the position of the ideal balance of security/privacy as applied to an 
imperfect world and is justified by its terms. 
The development of the good faith exception is notably inconsistent with other 
reasonableness paradigms.  For instance, a utilitarian analysis would have focused 
on the police officer’s diligence.  Adapting the Hand formula, the question would 
have been what the cost of remedying the mistake would have been compared to 
the cost of the harm times the probability of its occurrence.257  This analysis could 
have yielded the same results in all but one of the extensions of the good faith 
exception: Herring v. United States.258 
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In Herring, a utilitarian analysis would have come to a different conclusion 
because the arresting officer acted on the basis of a computer entry before his office 
received a fax confirmation of the warrant it had expressly requested.259  In 
Herring, the police officer in question learned that a person who was “no stranger 
to law enforcement” sought to retrieve an item from an impounded truck and 
requested his warrant clerk to check whether there were outstanding warrants for 
the man’s arrest.260  Finding no such warrants in his own county, the investigator 
again asked his warrant clerk to check for warrants in the adjacent county.261  
Computer records incorrectly showed there to be an outstanding warrant, leading 
the investigator to arrest the man and search him for contraband (successfully) 
before receiving a fax confirmation for the warrant.262  Problematically, the 
investigator’s own warrant clerk had immediately requested such fax confirmation 
and received confirmation of the computer error within “10 to 15 minutes.”263  
Given that the warrant clerk, apparently as a matter of routine, sought to check the 
accuracy of the computer record and the short time frame to confirm it, a cost 
benefit analysis in Herring would favor the defendant.264  Differently put, had a 
similar fact scenario of failed diligence been pled in the context of negligence 
(rather than civil rights) it is probable that the defendant would have been found 
liable.265  Consequently, the good faith exception is not consistent with utilitarian 
reasonableness. 
The good faith exception development is similarly inconsistent with a 
pragmatic analysis.  Such an analysis would have focused on the rational basis of 
the police officer conducting a search.266  This rational basis inquiry is inconsistent 
with Davis.267  Davis applied the good faith exception because police officers 
followed applicable precedent “to the letter.”268  The Davis court considered this 
conduct reasonable because an appellate court had “specifically authorize[d] a 
particular police practice.”269  A police officer could claim a rational basis to act 
beyond the letter of an appellate decision in order to engage in a practice that while 
not specifically authorized would be considered similar to it by some police 
officers.  This cannot be the test: the police officers in Kyllo certainly would think 
that their practice was reasonably within the scope of prior precedent.270  Their 
thinking was later supported by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
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Circuit.271  The determination admitting the fruits of their search into evidence was 
nevertheless reversed, no matter their honest and rationally based beliefs.272  Under 
a pragmatic reasonableness paradigm, they would not have been.273 
III.  REASONABLENESS AND THE RESOLUTION OF HARD CASES 
Part II has established that American jurisprudence has adopted diverse 
paradigms of reasonableness to resolve key problems in different areas of law.  It 
focused on a predominant reasonableness paradigm within each area of law.  Part 
III will probe further why paradigms of reasonableness matter to legal development 
within each area of law.   
Legal development means that the law adopts a conclusion to a problem 
distinct and apart from the one which the previously applicable legal rule, or 
principle, would have required.274  When such a development occurs, Frederick 
Schauer surmised “the judge would justify this conclusion by reference to general 
principles that lurk in various corners of the legal system,” or “ground the new 
principle in some already existing principle.”275  As this Part shows, the premise for 
this kind of legal change is not an obscure principle from some “corner of the legal 
system,” but a central change in the reasonableness paradigm.276 
Part III.A will show that a hard case arises when the formalist, pragmatic and 
utilitarian reasonableness paradigms require different solutions to the same legal 
dispute.277  Using the classic Cardozo decision Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff Gordon,278 
Part III.A will show the anatomy of such a case.279  Hard cases thus provide the 
common law with the opportunity for legal development, whether welcome or 
not.280 
As discussed in Part II.B, this development occurs within the confines of the 
multiple reasonableness paradigms.  Using the example of a recent dispute between 
an oil major and a Latin American national oil company, Part III.B discusses how 
the utilitarian concept of efficient breach is bringing about a paradigm realignment 
in contract law.281  The efficient breach example shows how hard cases lead to 
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legal development.  In Karl Llewellyn’s terms, in these instances, “‘principle’ is 
consulted to check up on precedent.”282  This check up is possible not because of a 
“grand style” or prudent practice of the judging, as Professor Llewellyn supposed, 
but is necessitated by the diversity of reasonableness paradigms in the common 
law.283  It is this availability of multiple paradigms of reasonableness within the 
common law which permits practicing lawyers and judges to probe precedent for 
principle in the first place.284 
As discussed in Part II.C, the failure to understand and properly to account for 
the multiple paradigms of reasonableness can lead to significant confusion and 
error.  Using the recent Supreme Court decision Fisher v. University of Texas on 
affirmative action, Part III.C will show that Fisher’s facial rejection of the good 
faith standard to determine the constitutionality of admissions programs, literally 
construed, leads to self-contradiction.285  Instead, Part III.C will explain that Fisher 
intended to reject a definition of good faith according to the pragmatic 
reasonableness paradigm and adopted a constructivist reasonableness paradigm in 
its stead.  It is this paradigm shift which makes the decision intelligible and can 
give guidance to courts in the future to determine the constitutionality of other 
admissions programs.  
A.  What’s a Hard Case? Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon 
Scholarship typically treats the first case, Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff Gordon, as 
a “great” case rather than a “hard” case.286  In fact, it displays none of the 
characteristics typically associated with a hard case: there was a “formal” rule 
which could have been straightforwardly applied (but was not),287 there was no 
linguistic ambiguity in the applicable rule itself or indeterminacy in applying that 
rule to facts,288 and one would feel no moral outrage irrespective who won the case 
as both parties are equally unsympathetic.289  Despite all this, the case is not treated 
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Cases, supra note 35, at 1060 (adopting no settled-rule definition for hard cases); Schauer Easy Cases, 
supra note 280, at 415. 
 288. See Wood, 118 N.E. at 214; cf. Schauer Easy Cases, supra note 280, at 415. 
 289. See Wood, 118 N.E. at 214; cf. Schauer Easy Cases, supra note 280, at 415-16; Northern 
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes J., dissenting). 
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as a gross lapse in judgment and affront to stare decisis by an otherwise brilliant 
jurist.290  In other words, the case must be a hard case, in which the ultimate 
outcome must genuinely have been in doubt.291  It thus reveals something new 
about hard cases: they arise not because of any of the typical symptoms of a hard 
case, but have a different cause altogether, namely the clash of reasonableness 
paradigms.292 
The facts of Wood appear straightforward.  A socialite and self-styled “creator 
of fashions” Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon (think perhaps of a forerunner to Paris 
Hilton) enters into a contract with an advertisement agency for “the exclusive right, 
subject always to her approval, to place her indorsements on the designs of 
others.”293  For the grant of the exclusive right, “she was to have one-half of ‘all 
profits and revenues’ derived from any contracts [her agent] might make.”294  The 
socialite, apparently cash-starved, broke the contract by placing her endorsement 
on fashion without the agent’s knowledge and withheld profits.295  Famously, the 
case notes that “[i]t is true that [the agent] does not promise in so many words that 
he will use reasonable efforts to place the defendant’s indorsements and market her 
designs,” but concludes that “such a promise is fairly to be implied.”296 
What makes the facts anything other than straightforward for a judge is that 
each paradigmatic conception of reasonableness requires a different result.  Classic 
formalism, from which Wood famously departed, would have deemed there to be 
no contract and would have sided with Lady Lucy.297  Pragmatic reasonableness 
reached the diametrically opposite result by implying a best efforts clause of which 
the agent did not run afoul.298  Utilitarianism similarly would have found a contract 
by implying a duty of good faith, but in any event would have found Wood 
insufficiently diligent and thus in breach.299 
1.  The Classical Formalist Solution 
Wood departs from a classical formalist solution, which would have resolved 
the case in favor of Lady Lucy because Wood’s promise would have been deemed 
illusory.300  That is to say, Wood’s agreement with Lady Lucy did not require 
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Wood to do anything or forbear to do anything at all.301  Because the agreement did 
not require anything of Wood, it did not impose detriment on him.  A “detriment to 
the promise is a universal test for the sufficiency of consideration.”302  There was 
no consideration given for Lady Lucy’s grant of an exclusive right and no contract 
would have been formed.303 
Classical formalism, like its constructivist cousin, rests upon a legal first 
principle from which the rest of the law can be derived.  The first principle of 
classical formalism is individual autonomy.304  This individual autonomy required 
a different rule of reasonableness than constructivism, namely one that maximally 
empowered parties to a contract to structure their bargain without judicial 
interference.305  The reasonable solution therefore was the one that most literally 
enforced what the parties objectively agreed to by the plain terms of their 
undertaking.306  In the case at bar, this was to find that there was no contract. 
Given the role of Wood as a professional agent to a lay person, this result 
would hardly seem unfair.307  In fact, it is highly likely that Wood omitted a best 
efforts clause from the contract on purpose to achieve his own commercial ends.308  
The brunt of legal form would have accrued to the detriment of the person best 
positioned to account for and to prevent it.  Adding that Wood hardly was very 
diligent in finding marketing opportunities for Lady Lucy, it also would not leave 
an undeserving defendant unjustly enriched.309  Whatever the reason to abandon the 
classical formalist paradigm of reasonableness as autonomy, it was not casuistic 
justice and its “immediate interests exercis[ing] a kind of hydraulic pressure.”310 
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2.  The Pragmatic Solution 
The pragmatic solution to the Wood dispute is familiar.  Justice Cardozo 
immediately announces that the agreement can be saved by implying a promise of 
reasonable best efforts on the part of Wood.311  This implied promise forms part of 
a duty of reciprocal, objective good faith.312  Consistent with pragmatic 
reasonableness, the reason to imply such a duty is to protect the effectiveness of the 
parties’ bargain.313  In Professor Burton’s terms, Lady Lucy clearly tried to 
recapture the foregone opportunity to market her endorsements herself and thus 
acted in bad faith.314  In Professor Summers’ terms, Lady Lucy manifestly evaded 
the spirit of the bargain.315  Premised upon this analysis of the contract, there is a 
total breach on the part of Lady Lucy, given her own failure to act in good faith, 
entitling Wood to the damages he claimed.316 
Omitted from the discussion in Wood, but equally as important as the 
implication of the duty of good faith, is the question what efforts, precisely, must 
Wood undertake to act reasonably under the newly constituted contract?  The 
question is important because the facts show that Wood failed to take advantage of 
readily available profitable opportunities to sell Lady Lucy’s endorsements.317  
Troublingly, the opportunities must have been profitable and economical for Wood 
to discover, or else Wood could not have sued for damages.  It must be implied in 
the decision that Wood’s efforts were reasonable despite the existence of additional 
commercial opportunities he failed to exploit. 
The reason that such an implication is fair is that Wood only needed to show a 
rational basis for his efforts.  To do so, he would have needed to offer only one 
person who would testify that he did not fall below minimum industry practice.318  
As he did in fact create some opportunities,319 he is likely to have found such a 
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person.  It does not matter to this inquiry whether in this specific instance more 
effort on the part of the promoter could have uncovered more lucrative 
opportunities.  This cost-benefit analysis is not immediately within the scope of 
good faith. 
Finally, the pragmatic reasonableness paradigm was not invented by Justice 
Cardozo for purposes of the Wood decision.  Pragmatist legal theory was already 
well represented for example in the publication of Oliver Wendell Holmes pre-
dating the Wood decision by decades.320  In fact, the common law of contracts 
changed in scope to meet commercial needs and practice and thus displayed a 
deeply pragmatic modality almost from its very inception.321  The use of pragmatic 
reasonableness to fashion an implied duty of good faith under the circumstances 
was not original in the sense of being invented out of whole cloth—it was a clever 
and careful adaptation of an existing paradigm of pragmatic reasonableness to new 
facts.322 
3.  The Utilitarian Solution 
Utilitarian reasonableness likely would imply a duty of good faith and thus 
give effect to the agreement in Wood.323  But the scope of the duty of good faith 
would differ in an outcome determinative manner for the case: Lady Lucy can keep 
the profits of her own marketing efforts and potentially receives additional 
damages from Wood for his breach of the implied duty of good faith.  The 
utilitarian reasonableness paradigm was recognized in nineteenth century 
jurisprudence and thus would have been available to Justice Cardozo.324 
Wood seeks damages rather than an injunction.325  For Wood to seek damages 
from Lady Lucy, he would have to prove that it would have been economical for 
him to find the same opportunities, i.e., that cost of the plaintiff’s own performance 
would have been less than the sum secured by Lady Lucy.326  The opportunities 
were in fact significant—one involving clothing for Sears, another an 
advertisement for a motor company.327  This fact in its own right is problematic for 
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Wood: it tends to show that he profitably could have been more diligent in 
marketing Lady Lucy’s brand than he actually was.328  He should have found those 
opportunities for the purely selfish reason to make more money himself.  In other 
words, it shows that Wood’s own performance of the contract was inefficient.329  
Applying a utilitarian calculus to the transaction therefore reveals that Wood would 
have breached his obligation of reasonable efforts first thus entitling Lady Lucy to 
act to mitigate her own damages caused by Wood’s failure to perform his bargain 
in good faith.330 
Utilitarian reasonableness thus reaches a result that is even more in favor of 
Lady Lucy than classic formalism.  She loses the legal argument that there was no 
contract.  This legal loss inures to her financial benefit: not only does she get to 
keep the money she has made from finding her own marketing opportunities as 
mitigation of damages for Wood’s breach, it is possible that her agent owes her 
more money for want of good faith.  In any event, it is likely that the court would 
side with her that there was total breach by Wood on account of his bad faith.331 
4.  Re-Defining Hard Cases 
Examination of available reasonableness paradigms reveals the problem faced 
by Justice Cardozo when writing Wood.  There was no true disagreement that as a 
matter of mechanical application of precedent, the rule premised upon the formalist 
paradigm had the best pedigree—the decision in fact concedes as much.332  Instead, 
the disagreement was whether the apparently most locally applicable legal rule was 
still “reasonable.”  Problematically, the available reasonableness paradigms 
disagreed as to the appropriate outcome for the case, creating genuine ambiguity on 
this point.  No undue “hydraulic pressure” of a disproportionately sympathetic 
party simplified the choice between them.333  The case thus was truly hard to 
decide. 
The case more importantly demonstrates that other definitions of hard cases 
ultimately can be reduced to the same problem.  Hard cases typically cite the 
absence of a directly applicable rule or a linguistic ambiguity in its potential 
application as a symptom of a hard case.334  This symptom upon closer analysis is 
not helpful, as most any fact situation will be “new” in some way and thus run into 
one of these problems.  In most instances, it is simply that this potential gap or 
ambiguity is irrelevant as existing law consistently can be extended to new facts no 
matter which reasonableness paradigm is applied.  A hard case does not reveal that 
there is no rule that is perfectly applicable to the problem—this is true for almost 
any case.335  It reveals that there is an indeterminacy in the legal decisionmaking 
process itself because multiple results are legally conceivable or would appear 
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reasonable to a well-trained lawyer.336 
It is also in this sense that hard cases arise when results are “hard to 
swallow.”337  When the result is compared to different reasonableness paradigms, it 
becomes clear that the decision is either out of synch with the basic values of the 
legal system (and thus inconsistent with formalism), out of touch with actual 
practice and moral common sense (and thus inconsistent with pragmatism), or 
imposes a cost-prohibitive burden on society compared to other possible solutions 
(and thus inconsistent with utilitarianism).  The decision again is difficult because 
any resolution of the problem is unreasonable in a different way. 
The discussion so far has led to a different, simpler, and thus better definition 
of hard cases and what happens when they are resolved.  It also demonstrates that 
what resolves a hard case “incorrectly” is to choose a result that is ultimately 
inconsistent with any of the reasonableness paradigms available to the lawyer.338  
Such a decision would cause “even well settled principles of law [to] bend.”339  
But, as Wood has shown, hard cases do not have to do so.340  In fact, most hard 
cases do not do so and simply pass unnoticed precisely because they remain 
consistent with one or two reasonableness paradigms already inherent within the 
law.341 
B.  How Does Law Develop?  The Theory of Efficient Breach 
The second hard case showcases that the law develops harmoniously when rule 
application is questioned within the scope of the pragmatic, utilitarian, and 
formalist paradigms in the context of efficient breach.  The case is adapted from the 
arbitration between Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd. v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A..342  It 
provides a good example of how utilitarian reasonableness would come to the 
conclusion that there should be an efficient breach when pragmatic and formalist 
reasonableness would strongly disagree.343 
The facts of the arbitration, as modified, again appear straightforward.  
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA*),344 the Venezuelan national oil company, 
entered into a joint venture agreement with a subsidiary of Exxon Mobil, Mobil 
Cerro Negro (MCN*) in October 1997, known as the “Association Agreement.”345 
The Association Agreement was concluded at a time of significantly lower oil 
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prices.346  After a change in government in Venezuela, and a significant increase in 
oil prices, PDVSA* sought to renegotiate the terms of the joint venture agreements 
with MCN* and other agreements like it, threatening to expropriate all venture 
partners who resisted the terms offered.347  MCN* did not agree to a renegotiation; 
its assets were in fact expropriated and arbitration commenced.348  The crude oil to 
be produced from the oil fields in question has a unique makeup to which the 
majority of U.S. refining capacity is calibrated.349  The ostensible reason for the 
expropriation was for PDVSA* to take for itself a larger share of the profits of the 
joint venture generated by larger oil prices.350  For purposes of this hard case, let us 
assume that the new partner would be able to produce more crude oil from the 
wells in question. 
The facts of the case again reveal a deeper legal tension.  They show that the 
theory of efficient breach is a legitimate answer to the hard case precisely because 
it stays within the confines of existing reasonableness paradigms and in fact 
actively claims historical pedigree to receive recognition.351  It is thus beside the 
point to argue that efficient breach is not a legitimate resolution to a contract law 
problem because it does not adhere to the pragmatic reasonableness paradigm.352  
Resolving this deeper legal challenge to the pragmatic paradigm requires 
something else entirely: a realignment of the pragmatic and formalist 
reasonableness paradigms to address and justify the inefficiency revealed by the 
efficient breach hypothesis or an adoption of the utilitarian paradigm if no such 
justification is possible.353 
1.  Probing Pragmatic Reasonableness 
Pragmatic reasonableness supports the traditional common law resolution to 
the PDVSA* dispute.  PDVSA*’s attempt to find another joint venture partner is a 
classic example of seeking to recapture a foregone opportunity.354  It thus runs 
afoul of pragmatic reasonableness and would be treated as a bad faith act.355  Under 
the circumstances, a court would likely enjoin the attempt by PDVSA* to switch 
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joint venture partners.356  Its remedial premise for doing so is that MCN* would 
suffer a harm that is not adequately compensable with money damages.357 
Utilitarian reasonableness fundamentally departs from this premise.  A classic 
utilitarian excuse against keeping one’s word is that fulfillment is “more harmful to 
oneself than beneficial” to one’s counterparty.358  A premise for this excuse is that 
the respective harm and benefit of fulfillment as a matter of principle is measurable 
in terms of money.  This principle may be undercut as a matter of proof if there is 
no ready market for the object of the contract.359  This question of valuation would 
not arise in the context of the PDVSA*-MCN* transaction, as there is a list price 
for the commodity in question (Venezuelan heavy crude), as well as reasonable 
certainty as to the projected production volume for which compensation would be 
due.360  These two factors permit a ready calculation of the buy-out value which 
PDVSA* would have to pay to substitute a different joint venture partner.  It 
presumably would pay only if it would be significantly more efficient to do so.   
Formalist-constructivist reasonableness takes a middle position between the 
pragmatic and the utilitarian reasonableness paradigm in this kind of a fact 
pattern.361  Breach under the circumstances is inconsistent with a duty of full and 
reciprocal cooperation.362  It is even more so as it is propagated by coercive 
means.363  At the same time, formalist-constructivist reasonableness would not 
permit MCN* to keep unanticipated windfall profits.364  Its exclusivity would 
permit it to take advantage of PDVSA*’s resources at a price that would have been 
negotiated differently had current market conditions been anticipated.365  
Consequently, a court would order the contract to be performed, but restore the 
economic balance at the outset of the agreement by adapting the pricing formula to 
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the new market circumstances through equilibrium adjustment.366 
PDVSA* is another instance in which there appears to be a basic inconsistency 
between the common law’s core reasonableness paradigms.  All three paradigms 
reach fundamentally inconsistent results.  Again the choice of the appropriate 
paradigm is not likely to be moved significantly by an irresistible swell of 
sympathy for any of the litigating parties.  In short, it is a situation of legal 
equipoise much in the same way as Wood was.    
2.  The Source of the Efficient Breach Logic 
The theory of efficient breach addresses this clash of reasonableness 
paradigms.  Its proponents argue that “if the promisor’s gain from breach, after 
payment of expectation damages, will exceed the promisee’s loss from breach,” 
breach of contract is desirable.367  Proponents of the efficient breach do not simply 
state a policy preference, but instead argue for the adoption of utilitarian 
reasonableness from the realm of torts to govern part of the law of contract, as 
well.368  Their point is thus not to criticize the law from the outside, but to change it 
from the inside.  It is a legitimate(d) argument within the common law. 
Proponents of efficient breach also give historical reasons for favoring 
efficient breach over its pragmatic competitor.  Richard Posner, the leading 
proponent of efficient breaches, in a recent article expressly relies upon Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ theory of contract law to formulate his own theory of good faith 
in contract law.369  Drawing on Holmes’ view that contract law provided a faultless 
regime of liability, Judge Posner submits that good faith, consistent with efficient 
breach theory, “is just a duty to avoid exploiting the temporary monopoly position 
that a contracting party will sometimes obtain during the course of performance” 
created by the fact that “one party may unavoidably deliver himself into the power 
of the other party for a time during the performance of the contract.”370  This 
historical reasoning again underscores that efficient breach in fact stands for 
continuity in the law as a whole—rather than changing it—despite the radically 
different results reached by it in hard cases. 
Opponents of efficient breach frequently argue that efficient breach is 
inconsistent with the predominant, pragmatic reasonableness paradigm of the 
common law of contracts.371  This criticism of efficient breach meets Judge 
Posner’s attempts to provide a pragmatic proof for the principle of efficient 
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breach.372  This line of argument does not address the underlying problem that the 
theory of efficient breach reveals: in the factual circumstances to which efficient 
breach applies, there is a clash of the pragmatic, utilitarian, and formalist 
reasonableness paradigms.373 
Remarkably, opponents of efficient breach have also responded in a different 
way to the challenge: they re-examine the “principle” or paradigm requiring the 
rejection of efficient breach.374  This re-examination may yet reveal that 
community standards have shifted sufficiently to warrant changing the rules of 
remedies within the pragmatic reasonableness paradigm—i.e., it may no longer be 
true that an efficient breach would be considered an attempt to recapture foregone 
opportunities within the relevant community.375  Additionally, it may be necessary 
to defend the inefficiency of the community standards upon the basis of legal value, 
as some authors have done.376  The rule would no longer be defended because it 
reflects community standards;377 common practice would be defended as reflecting 
a deeper political value in its own right and thus subsumed within the constructivist 
framework.378  If either route fails, the logical conclusion is that the cost imposed 
by the current rule is too high.  In this case, the utilitarian paradigm would prevail 
and govern this particular area of the common law of contracts.  
Put differently, legal development occurs not because of outside policy 
pressures but because the different paradigms of reasonableness create a stress field 
within the common law.  Hard cases make this stress field visible.  When a critical 
mass of similar hard cases arises and continuously probes the inconsistency 
between different reasonableness paradigms, these hard cases can eventually force 
a paradigm shift.379  Alternatively, the hard cases can cause a change within either 
the pragmatic or constructivist paradigms better to reflect actual community 
standards or the fundamental value upon which the legal system is formally 
based.380  In this sense, Karl Llewellyn’s ‘grand style’ correctly predicted the 
symptoms of change in the common law as the need to check up on precedent by 
reference to principle.381  But different from what he had surmised, this return to 
principle is brought about by an entirely internal structural element of the common 
law rather than an external force acting upon it.382 
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C.  The Reasonableness Problem in Fisher v. University of Texas 
The final hard case showcases the significant danger of misunderstanding this 
relationship between reasonableness paradigms:  Fisher v. University of Texas.383  
The Court’s majority opinion facially rejects “good faith” as the appropriate 
standard for determining whether or not a state university’s admission policy 
considering race violates the Equal Protection Clause.384  This holding is both 
confusing and confused.  As discussed in this Part, the Fisher majority only 
rejected a good faith standard premised upon pragmatic reasonableness.385  The 
Fisher majority in fact adopted a good faith standard premised upon the 
constructive reasonableness paradigm.386  A mechanical application of the decision 
therefore is ultimately unworkable.  The decision only makes sense if, rather than 
rejecting “reasonableness” as a relevant factor, it changed the meaning of what is 
“reasonable” in the context of an Equal Protection analysis. 
1.  How to Solve a Problem Like Ms. Fisher 
Ms. Fisher, a Caucasian Texas resident, unsuccessfully applied for admission 
to the University of Texas and thereupon sued.387  The University of Texas admits 
Texas residents automatically if they are in the top ten percent of their high school 
class.388  Automatic admission accounts for the assignment of more than eighty 
percent of available places for Texas residents.389  The admission decision for the 
remaining applicants relies upon a graph drawn on the basis of an Academic Index 
(AI), compiling GPA, test scores etc., on one axis and a Personal Achievement 
Index (PAI), set on the other axis, which “measures a student’s leadership and 
work experience, awards, extracurricular activities, community service, and other 
special circumstances . . . .”390  Following the Supreme Court decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, the PAI took race into account but did not assign race an independent 
numerical value.391 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari upon confirmation of a summary 
judgment for the university by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit.392  The Court recounted that the appellate decision affirming the summary 
judgment held that the “petitioner could challenge only ‘whether [the University’s] 
decision to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.’”393  
It noted that “in considering such a challenge, the [Fifth Circuit] would ‘presume 
the University acted in good faith’ and place on petitioner the burden of rebutting 
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that presumption.”394  The Court highlighted that the Fifth Circuit had “attempt[ed] 
only to ‘ensure that [the University’s] decision to adopt a race-conscious 
admissions policy followed from [a process of] good faith consideration’” 
concluding that “[b]ecause ‘the efforts of the [u]niversity have been studied, 
serious, and of high purpose’ . . . the use of race in the admissions program fell 
within ‘a constitutionally protected zone of discretion.’”395 
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in favor of the University of Texas 
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision.396  The 
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s good faith analysis because “the mere recitation 
of a ‘benign’ or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or 
no weight.”397  Rather, “[s]trict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school’s 
assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way without a court 
giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice.”398  The 
Court concluded that “[t]he District Court and Court of Appeals confined the strict 
scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s good faith in 
its use of racial classifications and affirming the grant of summary judgment on 
that basis.”399 
The Court explained that instead, “it remains at all times the University’s 
obligation to demonstrate, and the Judiciary’s obligation to determine, that 
admissions processes ‘ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and 
not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his 
or her application,’” and that the “reviewing court verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a 
university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.”400  This 
standard requires that the “reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no 
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity.”401 
2.  Constructivist Reasonableness of Affirmative Action 
Whatever its facial criticism of the Fifth Circuit decision, the Fisher Court 
itself adopted a good faith test to determine whether an affirmative action program 
is compatible with the Equal Protection Clause.  This test balances an individual 
right (non-discrimination in the Equal Protection context vs. privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment context) against a compelling state interest (making available high 
quality public education in the Equal Protection context vs. security in the Fourth 
Amendment context).  This balance is struck on the basis of constructivist 
reasonableness.  
The Court anchors its discussion of affirmative action in a fundamental 
individual right.  “‘Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry 
are by their very nature odious to a free people,’ and therefore ‘are contrary to our 
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traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.’”402  This fundamental individual 
right is applied to the educational setting centrally by requiring that a university 
applicant must be “evaluated as an individual.”403  To be evaluated as an individual, 
the applicant cannot be treated as a means to the end of achieving racial diversity in 
the university: “‘[t]hat would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently 
unconstitutional.’ ‘Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently 
unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial 
diversity.””404  Instead, to treat an applicant “as an individual,” the university must 
treat the applicant as an end in him or herself.405 
This analysis follows the same logic as the critical paragraph in the exemplary 
decision for constructive reasonableness, Kyllo.406  Kyllo anchors its discussion in a 
criterion “with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of 
privacy.”407  Fisher also anchors its discussion in a criterion rooted in the American 
public’s traditions as a free people.408  It then applies this axiomatic principle to a 
new situation: in Kyllo, the use of a new technology by law enforcement not yet 
tested by the Supreme Court; in Fisher, the use of a yet untested state university 
admissions program considering race as a factor.409 
Like Kyllo, the Fisher majority further protects a compelling state interest.  In 
Kyllo, this interest was the use of police power consistent with original balance of 
privacy and security in Year Zero.410  In Fisher, the interest is to make available to 
state residents a high quality public education consistent with state educational 
policy.411  Fisher quotes Grutter that “a university’s ‘educational judgment that [. . 
.] diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.’”412  To 
achieve this goal, a university does not need to exhaust “every conceivable race-
neutral alternative,” but the university must have considered “workable race-neutral 
alternatives,”413 which must come “at a tolerable administrative expense.”414  
Further, “a court can take account of a university’s experience and expertise in 
adopting or rejecting certain admissions processes,” even if such taking account is 
by no means dispositive.415 
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The Fisher interest, like Kyllo, can be reformulated in terms of a hypothetical 
original position in Year Zero.416  In this original position, people writing the 
original social contract would have to decide upon the value of a public education 
system in the abstract.  In the specific context of the U.S. Constitution, 
contemporaneous documents noted that “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being 
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the 
means of education shall forever be encouraged.”417  The balance, thus is one of 
allowing the state to provide the kind of education it deems conducive to good 
government in a free society while at the same time protecting the individual rights 
of those seeking admittance to state educational institutions.418  The Fisher Court 
applied this balance to the admissions program at issue in a specific affirmative 
action case. 
Fisher results in a reasonable college admission program when the reviewing 
court is ultimately “satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would 
produce the educational benefits of diversity.”419  Under Fisher, courts apply the 
constructivist criterion of reasonableness to balancing tests more generally.  
Analytically, a court would evaluate an admissions program from the point of view 
of an original position420 that assumes a scarcity of openings at the most desirable 
university programs.421  Further, one does not know which race, socio-economic 
background etc. he or she will be born into.422  Because of the scarcity of places at 
the most desirable universities, it would not be possible to admit everyone—i.e., 
there will be rejected applicants.423  Thus, one has to choose the admissions 
program that most benefits even the inevitably rejected applicant.424  The race-
neutral alternative would thus have to be worse from the point of view of the 
original position than the program adopted by the university. 
The Fisher court thus applies its own constructivist good faith test.  Treating 
an applicant not as an individual but as a demographic specimen is not to deal with 
him or her in good faith.  This good faith test is applied not to the creation of the 
admissions program, but is applied to the specific admissions decision to which it 
leads.   
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3.  The Source of the Fisher Confusion 
The Fisher decision is confusing because it appears to reject a good faith 
standard established in Grutter425 without replacing it with a clear alternative 
standard of its own.  As the previous Part showed, this initial impression is 
misleading on both counts.  The decision does in fact rely upon a standard of good 
faith that is consistent with the Grutter decision.426  It requires a constructivist good 
faith analysis of the application decisions taken by a university.427  It moves away 
from an analysis of the good faith in adopting the admissions program in question. 
What makes Fisher confusing is its indiscriminate treatment of “good faith” 
when it intends to reject only a certain kind of good faith.  The good faith rejected 
by Fisher concerns the assertion of reasons by the school as to why its program 
complies with the requirements of equal protection.428  The appellate court used the 
good faith analysis in order to determine whether the program fell within a 
“constitutionally protected zone of discretion.”429  This type of good faith is 
borrowed from the law of contracts, which deals similarly with the question of 
whether a party exercised discretion in good faith in the context of best efforts 
clauses, for example.430  The question, therefore, is whether other similarly situated 
actors would understand the reasons proposed by the university to support its 
program, i.e., whether the program had a rational basis.431  It is this type of good 
faith that is the target of rebuke by the Supreme Court. 
The failure to discriminate between different forms of good faith will very 
likely lead to future misapplication of Fisher.  Fisher’s rejection of a good faith 
analysis will likely hide from view that the decision still engages in a good faith 
balancing test.  This balancing test still intends to take seriously both the resources 
of the university and its educational goals.432  The problem of rejecting good faith 
is that the legitimate interests of the university are likely not going to be 
sufficiently considered in future decisions because of the confusing statement in 
Fisher that “the [u]niversity receives no deference” with regard to the tailoring of 
its admissions program to meet legitimate diversity goals.433  This overbroad 
statement specifically hides from view that the university need only consider 
“workable” solutions that impose “tolerable administrative expense”—with 
“workable” and “tolerable” both introducing a deference standard that would be 
precluded by the overbroad statement upon an initial reading of the decision.434 
Greater precision in the treatment of good faith would avoid precisely this 
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problem.  An understanding of the diversity of reasonableness paradigms, and thus 
good faith, is a necessary condition for such greater precision.  The Court’s 
affirmative action jurisprudence, therefore, will improve only once it admits to the 
necessary diversity of the law which it is tasked to apply.   
IV.  THE NECESSITY OF DIVERSITY 
Parts I and II established the fact that the common law relies upon diverse 
reasonableness paradigms.  Part I set out that these paradigms are premised upon 
fundamentally different theoretical starting points.  Part II theorized that hard cases 
arise when specific cases cause these paradigms to conflict with each other.  It 
explained how the paradigm clash in hard cases causes the law to develop.  It 
finally showcased that failure to understand the inherent diversity of reasonableness 
in the common law can lead to significant confusion and misunderstanding.  The 
question remains whether the diversity of reasonableness paradigms is an accident 
or a necessary feature of the common law.  This Part submits that the diversity of 
the common law is both necessary and desirable. 
A.  The Axiomatic Nature of Reasonableness 
Diversity within the common law is narrowly “necessary” because 
reasonableness is an axiomatic principle.435  Reasonableness is an axiomatic 
principle in the logical sense.  An axiom in logic is “an indemonstrable first 
principle, rule, or maxim that has found general acceptance or is thought worthy of 
common acceptance whether by virtue of a claim to intrinsic merit or on the basis 
of an appeal to self-evidence.”436  Consequently, the legal command that people 
ought to act “reasonably” cannot be reduced to some other principle.437  It relies 
precisely on the intuitive appeal that it is self-evident that people ought to treat each 
other reasonably.438 
The diversity of reasonableness paradigms within the common law does not 
permit one to “split the difference” between the various conceptions of 
reasonableness and arrive at a single, overarching principle.439  A disagreement 
between first principles cannot be bridged.440  Any attempt at reconciliation of the 
common law along the lines of some higher order first principle, therefore, must 
fail. 
Further doctrinal refinement also would fail to reduce the common law to a 
single overarching principle.  Such refinement would be fruitful only if no coherent 
conception of reasonableness had emerged.441  This is not the case—several 
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coherent conceptions of reasonableness have emerged.442  These conceptions 
require fundamentally inconsistent results in hard cases.443  Further doctrinal 
research, therefore, will confirm rather than refute the necessary multiplicity of 
reasonableness paradigms in the common law.444 
The only way to overcome the diversity of reasonableness paradigms within 
the common law is to choose one set of first principles and reject the others.  Doing 
so would require a significant change in current jurisprudence.  Choice of a 
pragmatist paradigm would upend, for example, tort law, constitutional criminal 
procedure, and equal protection jurisprudence.445  Choice of a utilitarian conception 
would also upend the common law of contracts and first amendment 
jurisprudence.446  Choice of a constructivist prism would undercut the strong value 
of responsiveness to community standards, which still underpins much of U.S. 
commercial law.447 
Such a choice could not be made “within” the law.  There is no legal criterion 
which would permit the choice of any one conception of reasonableness over the 
others.448  The legal means to choose between outcomes in hard cases is precisely 
by reference to a criterion of reasonableness.449  The multiplicity of reasonableness 
paradigms renders such an attempt either circular or futile.450  The choice of a 
single reasonableness paradigm thus is political and political only. 
Consequently, formalism, including constructivism is not a tenable general 
theory of law.  The existence of multiple conceptions of reasonableness deprives 
formalism of the fixed point within the law according to which one could engage in 
the Herculean task of the consistent reorganization of the common law as a 
whole.451  Formalism rejects that the choice of the first principle is a purely 
political one in which the law would become complicit.452  As this is precisely what 
is needed to overcome the diversity of reasonableness, formalism fails as a 
universal theory of law. 
B.  The Function of Reasonableness in the Common Law 
The reason that formalism ultimately fails also defeats pragmatism as a tenable 
general theory of law.  Formalism failed not because there was no first principle 
from which the law could be logically reconstructed, as pragmatism would 
submit;453 it failed because there were too many inconsistent first principles 
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embedded in the law.454  If this diversity itself is a structural quality of the common 
law, then law is precisely the kind of self-sustaining and self-sufficient limited 
domain pragmatists argue not to exist.455  That is to say that the pragmatic position 
is incorrect “that the success of a use of law should be judged by its effects.”456  It 
can and should be measured by reference to internal legal criteria. 
As discussed in this Part, the structure of the common law shows that 
pragmatic, constructivist, and utilitarian reasonableness are archetypical for the 
common law rule-making process.  This common law process is distinctively 
inductive rather than deductive.  The inductive generation of rules operates upon 
the basis of an oscillation between the paradigmatic command of the formalist, 
constructivist reasonableness paradigms.  This oscillation is structurally necessary 
rather than accidental.   
1.  The Grammar of Law 
The common law, like any other legal system has structure.  Pragmatists go 
along with this basic premise in supposing that understanding what law is, really 
means to predict what courts will do in the future.457  Such an undertaking 
presupposes at least the assignment of adjudicative power to the courts (why else 
fear them?).458  But, the determination of the successful legal argument is also 
embedded in this structure (i.e., the one that will bring about the predicted 
result).459 
More basically, this structure must determine what constitutes permissible 
legal argument.460  There are many statements that make sense as philosophical, 
theoretical or political statements—a state will survive only if it is defended by a 
constantly armed citizen army.461  These statements do not yet make legal sense 
because they are not yet linked up to the legal structure.462  One can thus predict 
with relative ease that they would not be understood by any court as a legal 
argument addressing a legal problem. 
The resulting structure of the law resembles the grammar of a language.  A 
grammar is commonly defined as “rules of a language governing [its] sounds, 
words, sentences, and other elements, as well as their combination and 
interpretation.”463  This grammar maps the scope of possible statements and 
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permissible relationships between objects and concepts within a language.464  The 
structure of law is a “grammar” because it similarly provides the rules of law 
governing its basic elements, i.e., identification of legal propositions, as well as 
their permissible combination and interpretation.465 
The structure of law, like grammar, can be identified on the basis of markers.  
Linguistically, these markers are morphemes identifying the grammatical function 
of a word.466  For example, “am,” “will,” and “would” are grammatical markers 
indicating the tense and mood of the word “to be.”467  On the basis of a study of 
these markers one can theorize the structure of the language and write its 
grammar.468  To theorize about law, one thus needs to find significant markers 
identifying its fundamental structure.  
Like a grammar, these structures are not permanent but transient and subject to 
change.469  But unlike grammar, they are completely self-contained and exhaustive 
of the entire conceptual world of that language at any given point in time.470  Like 
grammar, each law has a structure that in a way is entirely unique to it.471  For 
instance, a statement makes sense in French because it is consistent with French 
grammar, not because it is consistent with Latin or Italian grammar.  But like 
grammar, structures have historical and analytical points of overlap that further the 
development of the conceptual language through time.    
2.  The Conceptions of Reasonableness as Markers of the Common Law 
The pragmatic, utilitarian and formalist reasonableness paradigms are common 
law “markers” in this grammatical sense.  They function like the “–s” ending of the 
word “smoke” in the sentence “Raleigh smokes.”472  That ending identifies that 
“smoke” is the action “to smoke” (not an object, “the smoke”) and identifies 
Raleigh as the particular actor.  The marker “-s” assigns “smoke” its place (and 
meaning) in the English sentence “Raleigh smokes.”473 
Reasonableness paradigms modify rules in the same way to make them 
intelligible as a legal proposition.  For instance, pragmatic reasonableness modifies 
the rule “contracts must be performed” by adding the implicit “in good faith,” and 
explicating what conduct a court would consider sufficient performance of a 
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contract (conduct for which there is a rational basis).474 
More basically still, without reasonableness, the rule “contracts must be 
performed” could not be placed in the appropriate context to understand its 
meaning, just like “Raleigh smoke,” without the “-s” ending could refer to an 
incorrectly formed sentence or a kind of fume found in North Carolina.   This 
quality means that the reasonableness paradigms are significant grammatical 
markers because they determine the process of norm generation in the same way 
that predicates determine the process of proposition generation.475 
The reasonableness paradigms are not just grammatical but make up the “deep 
grammar” of the common law.476  As discussed above, the reasonableness 
paradigms are in an oppositional relationship.477  They present inconsistent first 
principles according to which any legal statement makes sense.478  This 
oppositional relationship creates a stress field within the common law that develops 
whenever an actual dispute reveals an outcome determinative inconsistency 
between the reasonableness paradigms.479  If a sufficient number of hard cases 
arise, the stress field causes a realignment: it forces an examination of the relevant 
paradigms to determine (a) whether the legal norm still actually conforms to 
community standards (pragmatic paradigm), (b) whether the legal norm should be 
modified to give effect to a fundamental right (formalist paradigm), or (c) whether 
the legal norm is too costly or inefficient (utilitarian paradigm).480  This 
examination, in turn, can lead to a switch of paradigms or to internal readjustment 
of the paradigms to respond to the tension.481  No matter the choice, the law would 
have changed in a substantive way but remained internally coherent in a 
grammatical sense.  
This grammar of the common law is precisely inconsistent with the pragmatic 
argument that law is not a limited domain.482  The stress field created by the 
oppositional forces of the reasonableness paradigms defines internally what the 
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common law can admit and what remains outside of its borders.483  It determines 
the (limited) potential legal solutions to any hard case.484  It is this stress field that 
defines the force of the law in the sense of its actuality and its potentiality—what it 
currently is and what it can become.485  It precisely shows that law is indeed a 
limited domain because it is analytically self-sustaining and self-sufficient.486  But, 
the diversity of paradigms means that it is a kind of inductive, not a deductive 
domain.  
3.  The Common Law as Inductive Normativity 
The deep structure which generates this force is an inductive normativity.  The 
inductive structure of the common law is intuitive.  Rather than being the result of 
comprehensive legislation by legal scientists, the common law is a creature of case 
law.487  This case law responds to specific fact patterns and legal arguments to 
resolve these fact patterns.  By addressing a sufficient number of fact patterns, it is 
then possible to establish a rule which appears common to each problem’s solution.  
This rule is then applied in future cases to fact patterns sharing a sufficiently 
common factual bond—until the time that a hard case points out the exception to 
the rule and thus leads to further refinement of jurisprudence and doctrine.488 
It is similarly intuitive that an inductive legal system could rely upon 
inconsistent first principles in different areas of law.  The common law establishes 
rules for a case rather than engaging in doctrinal interpretation.489  This rule 
establishment depends upon factual similarities of each of the cases relied upon by 
the parties to the case at bar.490  In relating the facts at bar to their resemblance of 
facts in prior decisions, it is possible both to derive the principle applicable to the 
resolution of the dispute at bar and to confirm and adapt its validity in light of 
additional factual problems not previously encountered in other cases.491  The 
application of inconsistent first principles, as such, is not a problem so long as these 
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principles are applied to factually unrelated legal problems. 
The inductive normativity of the common law is not only consistent with the 
diversity of reasonableness paradigms, but necessitates it.  Inductive systems are 
typically premised upon the observation of the outside world;492 they are 
descriptive systems.  In this sense, science engages in inductive reasoning.493  
Observation of the world leads to the formulation of scientific paradigms which in 
turn are refined by further observation.494  When a sufficient number of significant 
experiments contradict the current theory, the prevalent paradigm is abandoned 
once a new paradigm has been formulated that reinterprets the accumulated data in 
a more effective way.495  In such inductive systems, there is a typically a single 
structural paradigm at work at a single point in time.496 
Although the common law resembles such descriptive systems, it differs in an 
important respect from them.  The inductive process is not applied to observe the 
outside world, but to govern it.497  This means that at the level of theory, the 
inductive process in the common law does not theorize the outside world, it 
theorizes itself.498 
This important difference creates a structural necessity for diverse 
reasonableness paradigms to operate alongside each other.  First, the existence of 
an inductively formed formal legal paradigm of necessity must be a consciously 
theorized result from various data points.499  If the formal legal paradigm were 
always “applied” by common law courts by means of interpretation, the system 
would cease to be inductive and would be become deductive.500  A formal legal 
paradigm cannot operate “in real time” and instead must lag.  Logically, this means 
that there must be something other than the formal paradigm at work in everyday 
adjudication. 
But similarly, the law is more than a catalogue of policy preferences and 
current community standards.501  The common law is a normative system that seeks 
to order rather than describe the world to which it applies.  It seeks to impose 
certain centrally held values of prior generations on the current generations in order 
to provide both continuity and justice.502  Logically, there must also be a formal 
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paradigm at work in everyday adjudication. 
The different reasonableness paradigms thus fulfill a structural function 
without which a system of inductive normativity would cease to function.  On the 
one hand, the imposition of a single paradigm of formalist reasonableness (as in the 
case of constructivism) would transform the common law into a deductive system 
of normativity, applying norms exclusively because of the intrinsic value of the law 
irrespective of what the law outside requires.  On the other hand, the imposition of 
a single pragmatic conception of reasonableness would deprive the law of 
independent normativity.  The law would be an empty shell or conduit for 
describing the state of current practices.  Such a state would be particularly 
dangerous, as it would not enable long term expectations to form:  as practice can 
change unconstrained by law, there is no guarantee that future practices will not run 
counter to current needs.  Practice, therefore, needs to be contained by value.   
Therefore, the diversity of conceptions of reasonableness is a structural 
necessity for an inductive system of normativity to exist.  It is not only a historical 
accident or necessary stage in the dialectic on the way to some future utopia, it is a 
central feature to, and sign of health of, the common law.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The common law rests upon a diverse set of three reasonableness paradigms: a 
pragmatic, a utilitarian, and a formalist one.  It is because of the diversity of 
reasonableness paradigms that the common law has to resolve such a thing as “hard 
cases,” which only arise when the reasonableness paradigms clash.  It is through an 
internal realignment of these paradigms that doctrine and jurisprudence resolves 
these hard cases over time.  Because hard cases have to be resolved within the 
confines of the three reasonableness paradigms, the legal correctness of any 
proposed solution can always be established as a matter of legal reasoning rather 
than by debating the moral consequences of its result.  It is because of the 
possibility to resolve hard cases in a simultaneously principled and pragmatic 
manner that the common law has proved uniquely adaptive to new social and 
commercial circumstances without losing its inner cohesion. 
The conclusion that the law rests upon diverse reasonableness paradigms 
confirms the hypothesis, raised a few years ago by Professor Schauer, that the 
common law indeed represents a limited domain.503  Picking up where that article 
left off, this article has shown that the “Wittgensteinian practice” of the common 
law creates a limited domain because of procedural differentiation.504  The process 
of legal decisionmaking differs from other decisional models because the law 
produces outcomes according to its own distinctive decisional grammar.  This 
grammar relies upon the three different reasonableness paradigms to generate 
norms inductively through constant adjudication of new and novel legal disputes. 
Despite the conclusion that law indeed has its own internal and formal logic, 
this Article shares much with critical pragmatism.  Most of all, this article confirms 
that the common law is not a consequentialist enterprise, that no dialectic, no 
matter how enticing, could pave the way to some utopian republic.  In other words, 
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it considers that most grand theories of law or political theory have something to 
sell and that, if experience serves anything, it ain’t worth buying. 
Instead, the Article ultimately places its faith in finding the balance of 
balances.  It does so not by trying to find a midpoint between them.  Instead, it 
finds the value of the common law in its form of inquiry and its constant 
deliberative movement.  Accordingly, this deliberative movement is not moving 
towards something.  It moves to maintain what it has—diversity. 
